Nine B-29s took off from Kadena on Okinawa on the morning of 23 October 1951. Their target was Namsi, a North Korean airfield still under construction, sitting about thirty miles from Antung — where roughly a hundred MiG-15s were based on the far side of a border American aircraft were not allowed to cross.

Five and a half hours later the shape of the air war had changed. The day is remembered in the US Air Force as Black Tuesday, and it ended daylight strategic bombing in Korea.

Why the numbers vary, and what they actually mean

What made Namsi different from the earlier maulings was scale and geometry. The bombers were escorted — contemporary accounts put it at several dozen F-86s and a larger number of F-84s — and it did not matter enough. The MiG-15 climbed faster and flew higher than anything escorting the bombers except the Sabre, and there were not enough Sabres. The MiGs came down through the escort onto the bomber stream, and the escort could not be everywhere.

The B-29 had been the aircraft that ended the Second World War. Six years later it was a large, straight-winged, propeller-driven target at 20,000 feet, flying a straight and level bomb run, being intercepted by swept-wing jets.

On the Soviet pilots who flew MiGs over Korea — the part of this air war that was denied for decades.

What it was like afterwards

Bud Farrell arrived in the 19th Bomb Group at Kadena on 21 June 1952, eight months after Black Tuesday, as a B-29 gunner. He did not fly the Namsi mission. He flew in the world it created — and his memoir is one of the clearest accounts of what that world felt like.

After Namsi the three B-29 units — the 19th Bomb Group and the 98th and 307th Bomb Wings — moved to night operations and stayed there, with very few daylight exceptions, until the war ended in July 1953.

Night did not make them safe. On the night of 10 June 1952, over railway bridge targets at Kwaksan, MiG-15s destroyed three 19th Bomb Group aircraft and badly damaged several more. They had been caught in searchlights first — radar-directed lights that coned a bomber at their apex and held it there while the fighters came in.

Then there was the instruction that Farrell says shocked the gunners more than anything else in the briefing.

The reasoning was cold and correct. In the dark, a fighter could not aim without seeing you, and the surest way to be seen was to fire. A MiG would fly close alongside a bomber deliberately, drawing fire, while a second aircraft sat further out being vectored in on the muzzle flashes. No fire, no flashes, no target. Farrell describes a gunner on the crew he was replacing responding to a MiG formating on their wingtip by lighting his own face with an Aldis lamp and gesturing at the Soviet pilot — who turned on his cockpit light, dropped his landing gear to stay in formation, and gestured back.

307th Bomb Wing history from the Korean War — the unit that flew the Namsi mission.

A reconstruction of “Black Thursday”, 12 April 1951 — the earlier MiG ambush of USAF bombers that should have been the warning.

The strategic bill

Over the whole Korean War, B-29s dropped around 167,000 tons of high explosive and incendiary bombs — more than B-29s dropped on Japan in the Second World War, leaving the atomic weapons aside. Thirty-four were lost in combat, with perhaps another 48 lost to operational accidents.

The aircraft did the work. But after 23 October 1951 it did it at night, under a rule that forbade its gunners from shooting first, against a fighter based on ground that could not be bombed. Antung, at its peak, operated something in the order of 500 MiG-15s that were politically untouchable.

That is the real lesson of Black Tuesday, and it is not really about the B-29 at all. A bomber force is only as survivable as the escort and the rules of engagement around it. Take away the ability to strike the enemy’s airfields, put the interceptor two hundred knots and ten thousand feet ahead of you, and no amount of defensive armament fixes the problem. The USAF worked that out in a single morning over an airfield that was not even finished being built.

Preguntas frecuentes

What was Black Tuesday in the Korean War?

Black Tuesday was 23 October 1951, when nine B-29 Superfortresses of the 307th Bombardment Wing flew from Kadena Air Base on Okinawa to bomb Namsi airfield in North Korea and were intercepted by MiG-15s. Six of the nine did not return — described as the highest loss percentage the US Air Force ever suffered on a major bombing mission — and the raid ended daylight strategic bombing in Korea.

How many B-29s were lost at Namsi?

Accounts differ because they answer different questions. Three B-29s were shot down outright; six of the nine did not return to base, the difference being aircraft that crash-landed, diverted or were written off. The commonly cited figure, and the one used in the standard account of the battle, is six of nine.

Why was Namsi such a dangerous target?

The airfield lay roughly 30 miles from Antung, just across the Yalu, where about 100 MiG-15s were based — and the political rules of the war meant those Chinese and Manchurian bases could not be attacked. The bombers had to fly a straight and level bomb run into the heart of MiG Alley against fighters that could not be struck at home.

What changed after Black Tuesday?

The three B-29 units in theatre — the 19th Bomb Group and the 98th and 307th Bomb Wings — reverted to night operations and stayed there, with very few daylight exceptions, for the rest of the war, which ended on 27 July 1953.

Were B-29s safe at night?

No. On the night of 10 June 1952, over railway bridge targets at Kwaksan, MiG-15s destroyed three 19th Bomb Group B-29s and badly damaged several others after they were caught in radar-directed searchlights. Later in the war the bombers received Marine F3D-2 Skyknight night fighter cover on major Yalu targets.

Why were B-29 gunners told not to shoot?

Because firing revealed the bomber’s position. In darkness a fighter needed to see its target, and muzzle flashes were the easiest thing to see. MiGs would deliberately fly close alongside to draw fire while a second aircraft was vectored in on the flashes. B-29 crews were therefore ordered not to fire unless clearly fired upon.

How many bombs did B-29s drop in Korea?

Around 167,000 tons of high explosive and incendiary bombs — more than B-29s dropped on Japan during the Second World War, excluding the atomic weapons. Thirty-four B-29s were lost in combat, with perhaps another 48 lost to operational accidents.

Sources: Bud Farrell, No Sweat (koreanwaronline.com); Earl J. McGill, Black Tuesday Over Namsi; USAF Korean War histories. Loss figures for 23 October 1951 vary between accounts and are given here with that caveat.