On 23 August, Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces said it had engaged 14 targets across southern Russia and occupied Crimea in a single day, and hit 11 of them. Among them, according to the unit’s commander, were two Russian combat aircraft and a reconnaissance drone parked at Vityazevo airfield in Krasnodar Krai — roughly 300 kilometres from the front line.
Moscow has not confirmed the claims, and the damage has not been independently assessed. But parts of the account have been corroborated by a third party, and the pattern behind it is now clear enough that the Institute for the Study of War has given it a name.
Datos rápidos
- Date claimed: 23 August 2026, with follow-on strikes overnight 23–24 August
- Claimed by: Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces; Ukrainian General Staff
- Main location: Vityazevo airfield, Krasnodar Krai, Russia
- Aircraft claimed hit: Two fighters and one Orion-type reconnaissance UAV
- General Staff wording: “Damaged” — not destroyed
- Independently corroborated: Geolocated footage of strikes on aircraft in Krasnodar Krai (ISW)
- Russian MoD response: No specific comment on aircraft or air-defence losses located
What was claimed
The tally was published by Major Robert Brovdi, call sign “Magyar”, who commands Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces. Alongside the aircraft at Vityazevo, his list included an S-400 position at Gelendzhik, a Pantsir-S1 at Yeysk, a Tor system, and eight radars of various types spread across Rostov Oblast, Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea.
Ukrainian units also said they struck a MiG-29 and a Ka-52 at Millerovo air base overnight on 23–24 August. Describing the previous day’s results on 24 August, the Ukrainian General Staff used a more careful word than its own drone command had: the aircraft were damaged.

The identification is disputed — by Ukraine’s own side
The drone unit initially identified one of the aircraft as a Su-33, the navalised Flanker flown by Russia’s carrier air regiment. The Ukrainian open-source outlet Militarnyi disagreed, and its reasoning is visible in the photograph above.
The same analysis was blunt about the result. The drone sent against the Su-30SM, Militarnyi wrote, “failed to hit the aircraft directly, exploding nearby and starting a fire” — though it added that even a near miss can put a fighter out of service for an extended period. The MiG-29, by that account, took a direct hit.
It is an unusually useful correction, because it came from the claimant’s own information space rather than from Moscow. Nobody has yet published imagery establishing whether either aircraft is a write-off.
What is actually corroborated
The Institute for the Study of War, which tracks the war daily, confirmed the strikes took place without endorsing the damage claims. Geolocated footage published on 23 August, it noted, shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian aircraft in Krasnodar Krai; footage published the following day shows the strike on the MiG-29 at Millerovo.
ISW then characterised the wider pattern.
Why air defence, and why now
Suppressing radars and launchers is the unglamorous work that makes everything else possible. Every Russian early-warning radar removed widens the corridor through which the next wave of long-range drones can fly, and Ukraine has spent August widening those corridors rather than chasing headline targets.
Some of the cost on the Russian side is not in dispute. Regional officials in Krasnodar confirmed casualties and fires from drone debris on 24–25 August, and authorities in Rostov confirmed that the Novoshakhtinsky refinery suspended processing after damage. Russia’s Defence Ministry said it downed 148 aerial targets overnight and roughly 270 across the day — figures that are themselves unverifiable.
What can be stated with confidence is narrow: aircraft at two Russian airfields were attacked, footage of those attacks has been geolocated by a third party, and the two sides disagree about very nearly everything that follows.
Broadcast coverage of the reported strikes. Most imagery circulating from 23 August originates with the Ukrainian units that carried out the attacks.
Sources: Institute for the Study of War / Critical Threats Project, Militarnyi, Kyiv Post, Euromaidan Press, The Moscow Times, TASS
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