For as long as the United States has had an independent Air Force, defending its airfields against attack from the sky has been somebody else’s job. Specifically, the Army’s.
That arrangement is quietly collapsing, and at the Air, Space and Cyber conference this week the Air Force said so out loud.
The service is now standing up its own units, writing its own career field, asking industry for its own launcher, and considering creating its own acquisition office to buy the whole thing. It is, in effect, taking the mission over.
Informazioni rapide
The change: the Air Force is assuming responsibility for defending its own air bases against drones and cruise missiles, a mission traditionally owned by the US Army
Said where: AFA Air, Space & Cyber conference, 14–15 September 2026
Under consideration: a new acquisition office to oversee the point defence mission, per Air Force Secretary Troy E. Meink, 14 September
FY2027 request: about $1.4 billion for a missile-defence variant of the Air Base Air Defense System (ABADS)
FY2026 funding: $51.8 million in procurement for Small Unmanned Air Defense Systems (SUADS), in fixed-base and pallet-deployable variants
New units: the first point defence flights, rapidly deployable for agile combat employment in the Pacific, plus a new job specialty code for a base-defence career path
Battle lab: the Point Defense Battle Lab, stood up October 2025 and led by the 319th Reconnaissance Wing at Grand Forks AFB
Why the Arrangement Broke
The traditional division of labour made sense when the threat to an airfield was a bomber or a ballistic missile, both of which are expensive, rare and best handled by a dedicated Army air defence artillery branch with Patriot batteries.
It makes much less sense when the threat is a propeller-driven drone costing less than a used car, launched in numbers, at a base the Army has no unit near.
The bill for that mismatch has already been paid. Nine of the sixteen American service members killed during the hostilities with Iran died in drone and missile attacks on bases, including Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. On 27 March an Iranian missile and drone attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia severely damaged an E-3 Sentry AWACS along with aerial refuelling aircraft.
Those are not aircraft lost in combat. They are aircraft lost on the ground, which is historically how most aircraft have been lost, and which the Air Force had allowed itself to stop thinking about.

What They Are Actually Asking Industry For
The concrete artefact behind the rhetoric is a request for information issued on 17 July by the Command, Control, Communications and Battle Management Directorate at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base.
It asks for a ground-based launcher able to engage both cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft, carrying onboard sensors, a laser illuminator, command and control, and a kinetic weapon. The target set runs from Group 1 drones weighing up to 20 pounds all the way to Group 5 threats over 1,320 pounds — MQ-9 Reaper size.
That is an enormous span for one system, and the questions the RFI asks reveal what the Air Force has learned. It wants firing rate across all magazines and total magazine depth. It wants to know the manpower to sustain it, how it transports, and how fast it deploys.
Magazine depth and firing rate are saturation questions. They are what you ask when you expect to be shot at by many cheap things at once rather than one expensive thing occasionally.
The Acquisition Office Is the Real Tell
Secretary Meink’s remark about exploring a dedicated acquisition office sounds like bureaucratic housekeeping. It is not.
In the Pentagon, a mission without a programme office is a mission that gets funded out of whatever is left over. Creating one means a budget line, a colonel whose career depends on it, and a place for industry to sell. Meink had already told lawmakers in May that base defence had become “an increasingly high priority,” describing a span of work “from electronic warfare to directed energy to kinetic capabilities.”
The counter-drone gadgets have been arriving for a year — jammers, guns, lasers, battle labs. What was missing was somebody whose actual job it was. That is the gap being closed.
The Part Nobody Has Solved
None of this answers the cost question, which is the same one NATO’s air commander raised in Europe this week: defeating a cheap drone with an expensive interceptor is a losing trade even when it works every time.
The Air Force’s answer so far is breadth — electronic warfare where it works, directed energy where it works, kinetic weapons where nothing else will do. Whether $1.4 billion buys enough of any of them to cover a dispersed Pacific posture is the question the FY2027 budget will start to answer, and the answer will not arrive quickly.
Sources: Air & Space Forces Magazine (Matthew Cox, July 2026, and AFA conference reporting, September 2026); US Air Force RFI, 17 July 2026; House Armed Services Committee testimony, 20 May 2026.




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