{"id":21667619,"date":"2026-09-11T12:23:09","date_gmt":"2026-09-11T10:23:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/migflug.com\/afterburner\/boeing-747-g-onee-aaib-open-door-rain-unreliable-airspeed\/"},"modified":"2026-09-11T12:24:16","modified_gmt":"2026-09-11T10:24:16","slug":"boeing-747-g-onee-aaib-open-door-rain-unreliable-airspeed","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/migflug.com\/afterburner\/boeing-747-g-onee-aaib-open-door-rain-unreliable-airspeed\/","title":{"rendered":"Boeing 747 G-ONEE: An Open Door in the Rain Cost All Airspeed"},"content":{"rendered":"\r\n<style>.et_pb_title_container h1.entry-title { padding-top: 40px !important; }<\/style>\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Nothing about the night looked like the start of an emergency. On the ramp at London Heathrow, a One Air Boeing 747 freighter sat with its left forward passenger door &mdash; the L1 door &mdash; standing open, because the engineers changing its smoke detectors were walking in and out of the aircraft for hours. It rained. Not dramatically: 4.6 millimetres in the two hours before the job finished at 07:00, with a 6 to 10 knot easterly breeze drifting into the doorway. One of the engineers later told investigators he would not even have thought to close the door for that much rain.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>Six hours later the same aeroplane was descending towards Amsterdam with a MAYDAY declared, two of its four AC electrical buses dead, no heat in any of its pitot probes, and all three airspeed indicators lying to the crew at the same time.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The Air Accidents Investigation Branch published its final report into Boeing 747-433 G-ONEE on 3 September 2026, and it is one of the cleanest chain-of-events documents the branch has produced in years. Every link is small. Every link is defensible on its own. And the last link is a 290-tonne freighter pitching 7.6 degrees nose-down at 6,240 feet per minute while the autopilot faithfully chases a number that does not exist.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n<div style=\"background:#f5f5f5;border-left:4px solid #5C91FF;padding:20px 22px;margin:26px 0;font-size:15px;line-height:1.75\">\r\n<p style=\"margin:0 0 10px;font-weight:700;font-size:17px\">Quick Facts<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><strong>Aircraft:<\/strong> Boeing 747-433, registration G-ONEE, built 1991 (serial 24998), four Pratt &amp; Whitney turbofans<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><strong>Configuration:<\/strong> ex-passenger airframe converted to a freighter (747-400 SF) by Israel Aerospace Industries in 2006 &mdash; not a factory-built 747-400F<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><strong>Date:<\/strong> 8 February 2024, 08:13 UTC<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><strong>Route:<\/strong> London Heathrow to Hong Kong International, diverted to Amsterdam Schiphol<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><strong>On board:<\/strong> five crew, no cargo, no injuries, no damage<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><strong>Trigger:<\/strong> water ingress into Generator Control Units 1 and 4, isolating AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 4<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><strong>Consequence:<\/strong> loss of heating to all four pitot-static probes; all three airspeed indications erroneously low in icing<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><strong>Extremes recorded:<\/strong> 7.6&deg; nose-down, 6,240 ft\/min descent, peak 383 KIAS against a VMO of 365 KIAS<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><strong>Outcome:<\/strong> PAN upgraded to MAYDAY, safe landing on Schiphol Runway 06<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><strong>Report:<\/strong> AAIB Bulletin AAIB-29853, published 3 September 2026, four safety recommendations<\/p>\r\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">First, get the aeroplane right: this is a 747-433<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>Several outlets have described G-ONEE as a &ldquo;747-400F&rdquo;. The AAIB does not, and the distinction matters to the rest of the story. The AAIB calls it a <strong>Boeing 747-433<\/strong> &mdash; a 747-400 series airframe built in 1991 with Air Canada&rsquo;s customer code, 33. It flew passengers for fifteen years. In 2006 Israel Aerospace Industries converted it into a freighter, a 747-400 SF, tearing out the passenger cabin and building a cargo deck with Power Drive Units set into the floor to roll pallets around. That modification was certified by the Civil Aviation Authority of Israel.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>A 747-400F is something else: a freighter built as a freighter on Boeing&rsquo;s line. Boeing also does its own passenger-to-freighter conversion, the 747-400 BCF, and the AAIB is careful to note that the two conversions differ. This is not pedantry. Two of the four safety recommendations in this report are addressed to Boeing and two to Israel Aerospace Industries, precisely because the aircraft has two manufacturers of record and the water got in through a part of the aeroplane that both of them own a piece of.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\" style=\"margin:0 0 24px;width:100%\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"skip-lazy\" data-no-lazy=\"1\" loading=\"eager\" width=\"1024\" src=\"https:\/\/migflug.com\/afterburner\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2026\/09\/g-onee-747-departing-hong-kong-3-february-2024.jpg\" alt=\"One Air Boeing 747 G-ONEE climbing out of Hong Kong on 3 February 2024\" style=\"width:100%;height:auto;max-width:100%;display:block\"><figcaption style=\"font-size:13px;color:#777;text-align:center;margin-top:6px;font-style:italic\">G-ONEE climbing away from Hong Kong on 3 February 2024, five days before the incident flight, still wearing One Air&rsquo;s original red tail. Photo: Dltl2010 \/ Wikimedia Commons, CC0<\/figcaption><\/figure>\r\n\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">Link one: the deck that is supposed to get wet<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>When the crew boarded at about 06:15 they noticed water on the door mat and on the floor panels around it. Nobody thought much of it, and here is the thing: they were right not to. The entire main cargo deck of a 747 freighter is <em>designed<\/em> as a wet area. Pallets get left out in the rain and snow before loading; you cannot guarantee dry cargo, so the deck is built to shrug water off.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>That design promise is delivered by a stack of unglamorous parts. Sealant between the floor panels. Ten-centimetre polyurethane tape over the sealant. Ninety-one-centimetre moisture barrier tape across the whole deck. Drains in some panels and beneath the Power Drive Units. A drip shield over the avionics racks below, with drains at each corner. Moisture barrier curtains hanging down the front of those racks. Every one of those items is a line of defence, and every one of them degrades quietly with age.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The 747 took off from Runway 09R at 299 tonnes. The first EICAS message appeared after V1.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">Link two: two generator control units drown<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>A 747-400 makes its in-flight electrical power with four Integrated Drive Generators, one per engine, each feeding its own AC bus. Each bus has a Generator Control Unit &mdash; a GCU &mdash; whose job is to watch for faults and, if it sees one, to slam the doors: open the Generator Control Breaker, open the Bus Tie Breaker, isolate the bus from every source of power so a short circuit cannot propagate. It is a protective device doing exactly what protective devices are built to do.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>All four GCUs, plus both Bus Control Units, sit on the <em>top shelf<\/em> of the E1 and E2 avionics racks in the Main Equipment Centre, immediately below the cargo deck floor and just forward of the L1 door. GCU 1 occupies the far-left corner of the E1 rack; GCU 4 the far-right corner of the E2 rack. Their top surfaces are perforated with cooling holes.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>During the takeoff roll and initial climb the crew got a cascade of EICAS messages relating to AC system 4. The autothrottle disconnected and would not come back. LNAV and VNAV became inoperative, so they flew the departure on heading select and flight level change. They worked the QRH procedure for <em>elec ac bus 4<\/em>. Four minutes after the commander told ATC he had an electrical problem, AC Bus 1 also lost power &mdash; and with it the Cockpit Voice Recorder, whose only power source it was. The CVR stopped recording about nineteen minutes into the flight and never came back.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>Over the next twenty minutes the crew managed to reset AC Bus 4 three times. Each time it dropped again. The non-volatile memory downloaded later showed why: GCU 4 had logged a Sync Bus Protection fault followed by a Shorted Rotating Diode fault, either of which would trip the bus, and the resets simply reclosed contactors that the fault immediately re-opened. GCU 1 had logged a differential protection fault, which locks the bus out entirely &mdash; had the crew pressed anything for Bus 1, nothing would have happened.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>None of those faults were real. When engineers at Schiphol pulled GCU 4 out of the rack, a few drops of water ran out of the bottom of it. Shaking it produced a few more. Opened up at the component manufacturer, GCU 4 showed corrosion on several integrated circuits and water intrusion around the base of the chassis. GCU 1, which had come out dry, had corrosion and moisture residue inside as well. Both units passed most of their bench tests, for the simple reason that by then they had dried out.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n<div style=\"background:#f8f9fa;border-left:4px solid #5C91FF;padding:20px 22px;margin:18px 0 24px;font-size:16px;line-height:1.7\"><em>&ldquo;This service bulletin will reduce the possibility of water penetration into the main equipment center (MEC). Cracking of the MEC drip shield gutters has allowed water to drip past the MEC drip shield and through the exhaust plenum into the MEC. Water penetration into the MEC could result in loss of flight critical systems.&rdquo;<\/em><div style=\"margin-top:10px;font-size:14px;color:#555\"><strong>Boeing Service Bulletin SB-747-25A3555<\/strong> &mdash; issued November 2009, quoted in the AAIB report<\/div><\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Boeing wrote that fifteen years before G-ONEE flew into the North Sea. The warning was not new. The mechanism was not new. The aircraft had even complied with the Airworthiness Directive that made the fix mandatory.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">Why a bay under the floor is the worst possible place for water<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>Ask an engineer to design the most water-vulnerable arrangement possible and they would struggle to beat this one. The E1 and E2 racks carry every controller of the Electrical Power Generating System &mdash; GCUs 1 through 4 and both Bus Control Units &mdash; on a single top shelf, directly under a floor that is officially a wet area, a few metres from a doorway that opens to the weather. The only thing between the floor and those six boxes is the drip shield, and the drip shield also houses the plenum that blows cooling air up through the equipment.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>Boeing knows. After a 747 event in September 2021 in which water leaked from a main deck cargo floor into the Main Equipment Centre and took out a Flight Management Computer, the manufacturer started a review of MEC water ingress, finishing it in April 2023. The review concluded that failure of all six EPGS controllers would cost an aircraft every main AC and main DC electrical bus, that water could travel through the existing protection features, and that the previous mitigations had not terminated the problem because the moisture protection degrades over time. At that point Boeing did not recommend any specific in-service action. The G-ONEE findings were presented to them in October 2024.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The company already knew the answer, incidentally, because it had built it. On the 747-8, which entered service in 2011, the GCUs were moved off the top shelf onto different shelves lower down and spaced further apart, and the moisture barriers are standard equipment. About 150 747-8s are flying. There were 287 747-400 passenger and freighter variants left at the end of 2025, of which 236 were still in service.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">Link three: every pitot heater hangs off buses 1 and 4<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>Here is where a bad electrical day becomes something else entirely.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>G-ONEE has four combined pitot-static probes and four flush static ports. The captain&rsquo;s and first officer&rsquo;s Primary Flight Displays derive airspeed and altitude from the four combined probes. The Integrated Standby Flight Display &mdash; the last-ditch instrument, the one that is supposed to survive everything &mdash; takes its air data from the left auxiliary pitot-static probe and one pair of flush static ports. Three display chains, physically separate sensors, separate computers. Textbook triple redundancy.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The heating for all four probes comes from AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 4. So does the heating for both Total Air Temperature probes and both Angle of Attack vanes. The flush static ports are not heated at all, because static ports are far less prone to icing.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>Read that again. The <em>sensing<\/em> is triply redundant. The <em>survival<\/em> of the sensing is not. Lose those two buses and you have not degraded one airspeed channel, you have removed the only thing keeping ice out of every pitot tube on the aeroplane. And ice does not care which computer a probe is wired to. It forms on all of them, at the same rate, in the same cloud.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>That is the textbook definition of a common-mode failure: independent channels defeated by a shared element. The shared element here is not the sensor, not the wiring, not the software. It is the heat.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n<div style=\"margin:26px 0\">\r\n<svg viewBox=\"0 0 700 300\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" style=\"width:100%;height:auto;display:block;background:#f7f9fc;border:1px solid #dce3ee\" role=\"img\" aria-label=\"Diagram showing AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 4 feeding the heaters of all four pitot-static probes plus the TAT probes and AOA vanes on a Boeing 747-400\">\r\n<text x=\"350\" y=\"28\" text-anchor=\"middle\" font-family=\"Montserrat,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif\" font-size=\"15\" font-weight=\"700\" fill=\"#0d1117\">747-400: what the pitot heaters are plugged into<\/text>\r\n<rect x=\"120\" y=\"52\" width=\"180\" height=\"42\" fill=\"#5C91FF\"\/>\r\n<text x=\"210\" y=\"79\" text-anchor=\"middle\" font-family=\"Montserrat,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif\" font-size=\"15\" font-weight=\"700\" fill=\"#ffffff\">AC BUS 1<\/text>\r\n<rect x=\"400\" y=\"52\" width=\"180\" height=\"42\" fill=\"#5C91FF\"\/>\r\n<text x=\"490\" y=\"79\" text-anchor=\"middle\" font-family=\"Montserrat,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif\" font-size=\"15\" font-weight=\"700\" fill=\"#ffffff\">AC BUS 4<\/text>\r\n<line x1=\"210\" y1=\"94\" x2=\"210\" y2=\"126\" stroke=\"#5C91FF\" stroke-width=\"2\"\/>\r\n<line x1=\"490\" y1=\"94\" x2=\"490\" y2=\"126\" stroke=\"#5C91FF\" stroke-width=\"2\"\/>\r\n<line x1=\"80\" y1=\"126\" x2=\"620\" y2=\"126\" stroke=\"#5C91FF\" stroke-width=\"2\"\/>\r\n<line x1=\"80\" y1=\"126\" x2=\"80\" y2=\"166\" stroke=\"#5C91FF\" stroke-width=\"2\"\/>\r\n<line x1=\"260\" y1=\"126\" x2=\"260\" y2=\"166\" stroke=\"#5C91FF\" stroke-width=\"2\"\/>\r\n<line x1=\"440\" y1=\"126\" x2=\"440\" y2=\"166\" stroke=\"#5C91FF\" stroke-width=\"2\"\/>\r\n<line x1=\"620\" y1=\"126\" x2=\"620\" y2=\"166\" stroke=\"#5C91FF\" stroke-width=\"2\"\/>\r\n<rect x=\"20\" y=\"166\" width=\"120\" height=\"54\" fill=\"#ffffff\" stroke=\"#0d1117\" stroke-width=\"1\"\/>\r\n<text x=\"80\" y=\"189\" text-anchor=\"middle\" font-family=\"Montserrat,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif\" font-size=\"12\" fill=\"#0d1117\">Captain probe<\/text>\r\n<text x=\"80\" y=\"207\" text-anchor=\"middle\" font-family=\"Montserrat,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif\" font-size=\"12\" fill=\"#454e5e\">heater<\/text>\r\n<rect x=\"200\" y=\"166\" width=\"120\" height=\"54\" fill=\"#ffffff\" stroke=\"#0d1117\" stroke-width=\"1\"\/>\r\n<text x=\"260\" y=\"189\" text-anchor=\"middle\" font-family=\"Montserrat,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif\" font-size=\"12\" fill=\"#0d1117\">F\/O probe<\/text>\r\n<text x=\"260\" y=\"207\" text-anchor=\"middle\" font-family=\"Montserrat,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif\" font-size=\"12\" fill=\"#454e5e\">heater<\/text>\r\n<rect x=\"380\" y=\"166\" width=\"120\" height=\"54\" fill=\"#ffffff\" stroke=\"#0d1117\" stroke-width=\"1\"\/>\r\n<text x=\"440\" y=\"189\" text-anchor=\"middle\" font-family=\"Montserrat,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif\" font-size=\"12\" fill=\"#0d1117\">Auxiliary probes<\/text>\r\n<text x=\"440\" y=\"207\" text-anchor=\"middle\" font-family=\"Montserrat,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif\" font-size=\"12\" fill=\"#454e5e\">standby source<\/text>\r\n<rect x=\"560\" y=\"166\" width=\"120\" height=\"54\" fill=\"#ffffff\" stroke=\"#0d1117\" stroke-width=\"1\"\/>\r\n<text x=\"620\" y=\"189\" text-anchor=\"middle\" font-family=\"Montserrat,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif\" font-size=\"12\" fill=\"#0d1117\">TAT probes<\/text>\r\n<text x=\"620\" y=\"207\" text-anchor=\"middle\" font-family=\"Montserrat,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif\" font-size=\"12\" fill=\"#454e5e\">and AOA vanes<\/text>\r\n<text x=\"350\" y=\"253\" text-anchor=\"middle\" font-family=\"Montserrat,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif\" font-size=\"13\" fill=\"#454e5e\">Three independent airspeed chains. One shared dependency: the heat.<\/text>\r\n<text x=\"350\" y=\"276\" text-anchor=\"middle\" font-family=\"Montserrat,Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif\" font-size=\"12\" fill=\"#777\">Flush static ports are not heated. Source: AAIB Bulletin AAIB-29853.<\/text>\r\n<\/svg>\r\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>The QRH spells the consequence out without ever giving the crew a checklist for it. There is no procedure in the book for the simultaneous loss of AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 4. The crew had to read the <em>elec ac bus 1<\/em> and <em>elec ac bus 4<\/em> pages side by side and assemble the conclusion themselves: no pitot heat anywhere, avoid icing conditions, expect unreliable indications on the captain&rsquo;s, the first officer&rsquo;s and the standby instruments.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>They got there. Levelled at FL250 above the cloud, the commander asked ATC which airports within ninety minutes of flying time offered the best chance of staying visual on descent and arrival.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n<div style=\"background:#f8f9fa;border-left:4px solid #1565c0;padding:20px 22px;margin:18px 0 24px;font-size:16px;line-height:1.7\"><em>&ldquo;We&rsquo;d like to stay clear of icing&hellip; as best we can, that&rsquo;s our primary concern.&rdquo;<\/em><div style=\"margin-top:10px;font-size:14px;color:#555\"><strong>The commander of G-ONEE<\/strong> &mdash; recorded ATC transmission from FL250, quoted in the AAIB report<\/div><\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>Other aircraft on the frequency suggested Amsterdam. The controller confirmed Schiphol was clear, wind 5 knots, temperature 4&deg;C, and offered Newcastle, Glasgow and Edinburgh as alternatives. The aircraft was by now at roughly 290 tonnes, near its maximum landing weight. The crew took Schiphol for its long runways and because a crew who had just departed from there confirmed there was no cloud below 6,000 feet.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">Link four: the cabin altitude that forced them down<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>The plan was sound: stay high, stay in clear air, descend late into Schiphol&rsquo;s cloudless sky. The aeroplane had other ideas, and the mechanism is another quiet consequence of the same two dead buses.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The Cabin Pressure Controller System runs on AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 2. Losing Bus 1 cost one of the two pressurisation controllers, and its outflow valve simply stayed wherever it happened to be &mdash; in this case, open. Combine that with the air conditioning packs switching from high flow to normal flow, for reasons the data could not establish, and the cabin began to climb. About ten minutes after levelling at FL250 the cabin altitude started rising from 3,000 feet.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>At 8,500 feet the primary EICAS display switched the cabin altitude readout to amber. There is no other alert until 10,000 feet, when a cabin altitude warning fires and the crew must don oxygen masks. Watching the number climb through 8,600 feet, the commander made a judgement call that was entirely reasonable and entirely fatal to the plan: rather than fight a compound electrical emergency through oxygen masks, he started down early. The cabin altitude peaked at 9,246 feet and then began to fall.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The descent was initiated in flight level change mode. It took the aeroplane straight into the band of severe icing that the Met Office SIGMET showed lying below FL130 between Heathrow and Amsterdam.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">Link five: the autopilot chases a lie<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>The physics of a blocked pitot tube are simple and horrible. Airspeed is the difference between pitot pressure and static pressure. Freeze the pitot tube and its pressure is trapped at whatever it was when the ice closed over. The static ports keep working. In a climb, static pressure falls, so the difference grows and the airspeed indicator over-reads. In a descent, static pressure rises, the difference shrinks, and the airspeed indicator <em>under-reads<\/em>. Actual speed becomes irrelevant. The instrument has stopped being an airspeedometer and started being a crude altimeter.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>Passing roughly 12,000 feet, G-ONEE entered icing. All three airspeed indications began to fall. The autopilot was in flight level change, a mode whose entire job is to hold a selected airspeed by adjusting pitch. It saw the speed decaying and did the only thing it knows: it lowered the nose to get the speed back.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The speed did not come back, because there was no speed to come back. So the autopilot lowered the nose further.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The commander, who had just handed control to the pilot monitoring so he could verify the routing in the FMC, spotted the pitch and told him to reduce the body angle. The handling pilot added thrust &mdash; which is exactly the right input to raise the nose in flight level change &mdash; and the aeroplane kept pitching down, because the indicated airspeed kept falling. The standby instrument was reading something like 100 knots. An <em>ias disagree<\/em> caution appeared. The pitch reached 7.6 degrees nose-down with a rate of descent of 6,240 feet per minute.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>They were about to intervene when the aeroplane solved the problem itself. Descending through 10,000 feet it came out of the icing layer, the Total Air Temperature probe unfroze, and the captain&rsquo;s indicated airspeed leapt from 260 to 345 knots in four seconds. The autopilot pitched up to recover its target. The handling pilot pulled the thrust to idle. Neither reaction was fast enough to beat the overspeed warning.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The aircraft touched 383 KIAS. Against a VMO of 365 KIAS at that altitude, that is an 18-knot exceedance &mdash; two knots under the 20-knot threshold that would have required an overspeed inspection, so none was carried out. The warning lasted 55 seconds. The crew did not deploy the speedbrakes, and their reasoning is the most telling detail in the entire report: having watched the airspeed collapse and then explode, they no longer believed any of it, and they were not going to add drag on the strength of a number they did not trust.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The commander declared a MAYDAY. The aircraft broke cloud at 6,000 feet and stayed in clear air. While configuring for the approach they picked up a <em>flaps drive<\/em> caution, ran another checklist, recalculated their landing distance, and put a 747 down on Schiphol&rsquo;s Runway 06 about 85 minutes after leaving Heathrow.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\" style=\"margin:0 0 24px;width:100%\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"skip-lazy\" data-no-lazy=\"1\" loading=\"eager\" width=\"1024\" src=\"https:\/\/migflug.com\/afterburner\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/4\/2026\/09\/one-air-g-onee-747-freighter-cargo-ramp.jpg\" alt=\"One Air Boeing 747 freighter G-ONEE parked on a cargo ramp during loading\" style=\"width:100%;height:auto;max-width:100%;display:block\"><figcaption style=\"font-size:13px;color:#777;text-align:center;margin-top:6px;font-style:italic\">G-ONEE on a cargo ramp in August 2024. On a 747 freighter the main deck is designed as a wet area, because pallets cannot be guaranteed dry &mdash; which is precisely why the equipment bay beneath it depends on layers of tape, sealant and a drip shield. Photo: LN9267 \/ Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0<\/figcaption><\/figure>\r\n\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">Why three independent airspeed systems can fail in exactly the same way<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>Redundancy in aviation is usually about <em>diversity<\/em>: two hydraulic systems routed down opposite sides of the fuselage, two engines fed from separate tanks, two computers written by separate teams. The assumption is that a single fault cannot reach all of them.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>Pitot heat quietly breaks that assumption. The four probes on a 747-400 are genuinely independent as sensors. They are not independent as <em>survivors<\/em>, because their heaters are fed from just two of the four AC buses, and those two buses have their controllers sitting side by side under a wet floor. The redundancy is real right up to the moment the common element fails, and then it evaporates all at once.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The AAIB report explicitly invokes Air France 447, the A330 lost over the Atlantic in 2009 after pitot icing produced a temporary loss of reliable airspeed. The branch is not drawing an equivalence &mdash; the G-ONEE crew were never close to losing control &mdash; but it makes the point that unreliable airspeed combined with high workload has challenged crews before, even when the technical failure was brief.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n<div style=\"position:relative;padding-bottom:56.25%;height:0;overflow:hidden;margin:24px 0\"><iframe class=\"skip-lazy\" data-no-lazy=\"1\" loading=\"eager\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/CCjpnC5i6zA\" style=\"position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:100%;height:100%;border:0\" allowfullscreen><\/iframe><\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>If you want the physics rather than the prose, the clip above walks through pitot-static errors and shows exactly why a blocked pitot tube behaves like an altimeter in a descent.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">What an unreliable airspeed procedure actually asks of a crew<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>The Boeing memory items for <em>airspeed unreliable<\/em> are brutally simple: disconnect the autopilot, disconnect the autothrottle, set 4 degrees nose-up and 80 percent N1 with the flaps up. Those numbers are not a guess. They are a known attitude and power combination that will keep a 747 flying safely while the crew works out what is happening.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>They will also, at that weight and altitude, produce roughly level flight or a slight climb. Which is a problem when the reason you are descending is that your cabin altitude is heading for 10,000 feet, and the ice you need to escape is below you.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The crew saw this coming. At FL250 they had already opened the <em>Flight With Unreliable Airspeed<\/em> tables in the Performance Inflight chapter and had the safety pilot derive a descent set: approximately 0 degrees of pitch with idle thrust, giving about 0.84 Mach or 290 KIAS and 2,100 feet per minute down. The agreement was that if the airspeed went, they would disconnect and fly that. It was a genuinely good piece of pre-emptive airmanship.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>They never finished the discussion. The rising cabin altitude interrupted them and pushed them into an early descent before the briefing was complete. When the speeds did go, the autopilot stayed in, and the aeroplane went to 7.6 degrees nose-down rather than the 0 degrees they had in mind.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The AAIB&rsquo;s observation here is worth quoting in substance because it is the most portable lesson in the report: when you deviate from a procedure, set the boundaries first. Had the crew agreed an upper and lower pitch limit around 0 degrees and a commitment to disconnect the autopilot at that point, the pitch exceedance and the overspeed might never have happened.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>That is a note, not a criticism. The report is clear that the crew&rsquo;s training, their structured TDODAR decision-making and their use of a third pilot in the jump seat were likely significant factors in preventing a worse outcome. ATC recordings from the Heathrow departure frequency captured moments where they simply could not answer the radio. They were flying a degraded aeroplane with more cautions than would fit on one EICAS page &mdash; the system displays eleven at a time and then makes you scroll &mdash; while holding a Standard Instrument Departure with half the autopilot gone. They got it on the ground with nobody hurt and no damage.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">The villain, if there is one, is a drip shield<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>The AAIB could not determine the exact path the water took from the cargo deck floor into GCUs 1 and 4. What it found instead was a list of small failures of the water ingress protection, any combination of which could have done it.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The rubber dam around the L1 door mat was missing sealant in its forward right corner, so water could escape the mat and run along the floor above the racks. A screw was missing from beneath Power Drive Unit 4, which sits directly above the E1 and E2 racks, leaving a hole straight onto the top of the drip shield. Sections of polyurethane tape on the floor near the L1 door were cracked or missing &mdash; and were still cracked or missing in June 2024, after the operator had already repaired the area at an A-check in March. The drip shield&rsquo;s end cover plates, immediately above the GCU 1 and GCU 4 positions, had compromised sealant. The moisture barrier curtains that should have hung across the front of the racks were not fitted at all, because when the operator took delivery of the aircraft from a previous operator, nobody realised Israel Aerospace Industries considered them standard equipment rather than an optional Boeing service bulletin.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>And then there is the drip shield itself. It could not be inspected without pulling every floor panel, so the examination waited for the C-check in Germany in August 2024. The fibreglass reinforcing overcoat looked undamaged. But when investigators removed an L-shaped bracket beside Power Drive Unit 4 to repair some cracked sealant, they found the drip shield underneath was damaged and holed. Removing the bracket on the other side of the same PDU revealed the same thing.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>That is the sentence the whole report turns on. The final barrier between a wet floor and every electrical controller on the aeroplane had holes in it, hidden under a bracket, and there was no maintenance task in existence that would ever have found them.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">Fifteen years of warnings, and the word &ldquo;terminating&rdquo;<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>This has happened before. In January 2008 a passenger 747-400, VH-OJM, lost AC buses 1, 2 and 3 on descent into Bangkok and could not recover them. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau traced it to water ingress into GCUs 1, 2 and 3, after cabin crew reported a substantial leak in the forward galley &mdash; which sits above the Main Equipment Centre. The ATSB never identified the path either. By the time it drafted its report in 2010, Boeing had received 52 reports of damage to 747-400 drip shields or gutters.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>Boeing issued Service Bulletin SB-747-25A3555 in November 2009, recommending aluminium reinforcing brackets for cracking gutters, flanged sleeves and drain tubes as an interim measure, and a fibreglass reinforcing overcoat on the drip shield as the <strong>terminating action<\/strong>. The FAA made it mandatory with Airworthiness Directive 2012-15-10. G-ONEE had complied.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>&ldquo;Terminating action&rdquo; is a term of art in maintenance. It means: do this, and you are done. And because the fibreglass overcoat was a terminating action, no repetitive inspection of the drip shield was ever required afterwards. The cracks on G-ONEE were found only because the operator decided to look after the incident.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>Separately, a 2005 Boeing service bulletin had recommended the moisture barrier curtains for cargo 747-400s, noting that three operators had reported water contamination of the units in the E1 and E2 rack. That one was never mandated by an Airworthiness Directive. Israel Aerospace Industries has its own set &mdash; SB 366-25-122 from 2012, SB 366-25-094 from 2017, SB 366-25-150 from 2018 &mdash; and reminded its operators about them in a message dated 6 May 2024, three months after the G-ONEE flight.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>Meanwhile the only scheduled look at the floor above the Main Equipment Centre was a general zonal inspection of the entire 56-by-6-metre cargo deck at every A-check, every 1,000 flight hours, normally carried out from standing height. That inspection cannot see cracked sealant reliably and definitely cannot see a missing screw under a Power Drive Unit that has to be pivoted up on its hinge. Another 747-400 freighter operator, which had suffered its own water ingress events including an air turn back and an emergency landing, had already written itself a dedicated drip shield, drain line and floorboard inspection for every C-check. It did that on its own initiative.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">Four safety recommendations, two addressees<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>The AAIB issued four recommendations, split evenly between the aircraft manufacturer and the freighter manufacturer, and they are almost word-for-word pairs.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p><strong>2026-013<\/strong> asks Boeing Commercial Airplanes to introduce a maintenance requirement on 747-400 freighter variants to repetitively inspect the condition of the drip shield over the E1 and E2 racks. <strong>2026-014<\/strong> asks Israel Aerospace Industries to do the same for the 747-400 SF.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p><strong>2026-015<\/strong> asks Boeing to introduce a maintenance requirement to repetitively inspect in detail the condition of the floor panel seals, waterproof tape, power drive units and L1 door floor mat in the area above and near the Main Equipment Centre. <strong>2026-016<\/strong> asks Israel Aerospace Industries for the same thing on the 747-400 SF.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>Boeing told the AAIB in August 2025, after a meeting with the branch and the FAA, that periodic inspection of the cargo deck floor sealing and of the drip trays and drains would help, and that it would raise the additional inspections at the next meeting of the 747-400 Maintenance Steering Group. That group was expected to meet in the second quarter of 2026. At the time the report was written, no meeting date had been set.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">And then it happened again<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>After the report was drafted, G-ONEE did it a second time.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>On 22 May 2026, departing Ezhou Huahu International Airport in China, the EICAS threw up electrical faults during taxi indicating failures of GCU 2 and GCU 3. The aircraft returned to stand. Engineers found some moisture on a circuit breaker panel on the right side of the Main Equipment Centre, but nothing on the E1 or E2 racks. They swapped GCUs 1 and 2, swapped GCUs 3 and 4, ran successful ground checks and sent the aeroplane on its way. Shortly after takeoff, AC Bus 4 lost power in a manner consistent with a failure of GCU 4. The aircraft returned and landed.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>Subsequent examination found water in some of the seat tracks above the Main Equipment Centre beneath the moisture barrier tape, poor sealant between floorboards, damaged moisture barrier tape, and a floor drain that had been taped over. The cargo had been loaded in heavy rain. The ground handling team had lifted the top layer of plastic on each pallet to tip off the pooled water first, which left sheeting water on the pallet bases and heavy droplets on the covers &mdash; nothing unusual for a wet cargo operation.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The operator is now inspecting the cargo deck floor area across its 747 fleet and plans to add a general visual inspection of the main deck moisture barrier integrity and door threshold drain function at weekly check and A-check intervals. On the day after the 2024 incident it had already published a technical notice requiring main entry, maintenance access and cargo doors to be kept closed during rain, ice and snow whenever possible, and an inspection around the Main Equipment Centre hatch and the drip trays if water ingress was unavoidable.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h2 style=\"padding-top:22px\">The shape of the thing<\/h2>\r\n\r\n<p>Chain-of-events stories are compelling because every link looks harmless in isolation, and this one is a masterclass. An open door during light overnight rain. A corner of sealant missing from a rubber mat. One screw absent from a cargo roller. Some cracked tape. A hole under a bracket in a shield nobody was required to look at. Two boxes on a top shelf under a floor that is allowed to be wet.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>Add them together and you get a 747 over the North Sea with half its electrical system gone, no pitot heat, a cabin climbing towards oxygen mask altitude, a severe icing layer in the only direction available, and three airspeed indicators that agree with each other and are all wrong.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The crew handled it. They built their own checklist out of two that were never meant to be combined, they worked TDODAR, they used the third pilot properly, they pre-derived a descent profile for a failure that had not happened yet, and they landed a 290-tonne freighter at an airport they had picked for its runways. Nobody was hurt.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>The aeroplane, though, is still flying under a maintenance regime that never once required anyone to check whether the last barrier between a wet floor and the electrical brain of a 747 still had a hole in it. That is what the four recommendations are for.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n<div style=\"position:relative;padding-bottom:56.25%;height:0;overflow:hidden;margin:24px 0\"><iframe class=\"skip-lazy\" data-no-lazy=\"1\" loading=\"eager\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/z4Sj780HXsM\" style=\"position:absolute;top:0;left:0;width:100%;height:100%;border:0\" allowfullscreen><\/iframe><\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n<p>G-ONEE itself, departing East Midlands for Hong Kong &mdash; the same run it was flying out of Heathrow on 8 February 2024.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<style>.mfq{margin:34px 0 8px}.mfq h2{font:26px\/1.3 \"Gilroy semiBold\",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;color:#0d1117;padding-top:22px;margin:0 0 6px}.mfq .qa details{border-top:1px solid #5C91FF;margin:0;padding:0}.mfq .qa details:last-of-type{border-bottom:1px solid #e2e7ee}.mfq .qa summary{cursor:pointer;list-style:none;display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;gap:16px;padding:22px 26px;font:18px\/1.7 \"Gilroy semiBold\",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;color:#0d1117}.mfq .qa summary::-webkit-details-marker{display:none}.mfq .qa summary::after{content:\"+\";font:24px Helvetica,sans-serif;color:#3568e0;flex:0 0 auto}.mfq .qa details[open] summary::after{content:\"\\2013\"}.mfq .qa details:hover summary{color:#3568e0}.mfq .qa .a{font:16px\/1.7 \"Gilroy regular\",Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif;color:#454e5e;padding:0 26px 24px}.mfq .qa .a a{color:#3568e0}@media(max-width:680px){.mfq .qa summary{padding:18px 14px;font-size:17px}.mfq .qa .a{padding:0 14px 20px}}<\/style>\r\n\r\n\r\n<section class=\"mfq\"><h2>Frequently Asked Questions<\/h2><div class=\"qa\"><details open><summary>What caused the Boeing 747 G-ONEE incident on 8 February 2024?<\/summary><div class=\"a\">Water. Rain entered the main cargo deck of One Air Boeing 747-433 G-ONEE through the L1 door, which had been left open overnight at London Heathrow during maintenance. The water reached Generator Control Units 1 and 4 in the E1\/E2 rack beneath the cargo deck floor, and the wet GCUs sensed non-existent electrical faults and commanded contactors to open, isolating AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 4. The AAIB was unable to determine the exact path the water took, but found multiple weaknesses in the aircraft&rsquo;s water ingress protection.<\/div><\/details><details><summary>Is G-ONEE a Boeing 747-400F?<\/summary><div class=\"a\">No. The AAIB designates it a <strong>Boeing 747-433<\/strong>, a 747-400 series airframe built in 1991 as a passenger aircraft and converted to a freighter (747-400 SF) by Israel Aerospace Industries in 2006. A 747-400F is a factory-built freighter, and Boeing&rsquo;s own conversion is the 747-400 BCF. The distinction matters because the AAIB addressed two of its four safety recommendations to Boeing and two to Israel Aerospace Industries.<\/div><\/details><details><summary>Why did all three airspeed indicators fail at the same time?<\/summary><div class=\"a\">Because the common element was heating, not sensing. The Boeing 747-400 has four combined pitot-static probes feeding three independent airspeed displays, but the heaters for all four probes are powered from AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 4. When both buses were lost, no pitot probe on the aircraft had heat. Entering icing at about 12,000 ft, all three pitot tubes froze, and because the aircraft was descending, the trapped pitot pressure made every indicator under-read. This is a classic common-mode failure: redundant sensors defeated by a shared dependency.<\/div><\/details><details><summary>How steeply did G-ONEE descend during the unreliable airspeed event?<\/summary><div class=\"a\">The autopilot, in flight level change mode, lowered the nose to chase an airspeed that was falsely decaying. The AAIB records a recorded pitch of 7.6&deg; nose-down with an associated rate of descent of approximately 6,240 ft\/min. When the aircraft exited icing at about 10,000 ft the captain&rsquo;s indicated airspeed jumped from 260 to 345 kt in four seconds, triggering an overspeed warning that peaked at 383 KIAS &mdash; 18 kt above the VMO of 365 KIAS for that altitude, and lasting 55 seconds.<\/div><\/details><details><summary>Was anyone injured and was the aircraft damaged?<\/summary><div class=\"a\">No. There were five crew on board G-ONEE and no cargo. The AAIB records no injuries and no damage. The crew declared a PAN, later upgraded it to a MAYDAY, managed a subsequent flap drive problem and landed safely on Runway 06 at Amsterdam Schiphol, roughly 85 minutes after departing Heathrow. Because the 18 kt overspeed fell below the operator&rsquo;s 20 kt threshold, no overspeed inspection was required.<\/div><\/details><details><summary>What did the AAIB recommend after the G-ONEE investigation?<\/summary><div class=\"a\">Four safety recommendations, issued in pairs. Recommendations 2026-013 and 2026-014 ask Boeing Commercial Airplanes and Israel Aerospace Industries respectively to introduce a repetitive inspection of the drip shield over the E1 and E2 racks in the Main Equipment Centre. Recommendations 2026-015 and 2026-016 ask the same two organisations to introduce a detailed repetitive inspection of the floor panel seals, waterproof tape, power drive units and L1 door floor mat above and near the Main Equipment Centre. Until now the fibreglass reinforcing overcoat mandated by FAA Airworthiness Directive 2012-15-10 was treated as a terminating action, with no follow-up inspection required.<\/div><\/details><\/div><\/section>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@type\":\"FAQPage\",\"mainEntity\":[{\"@type\":\"Question\",\"name\":\"What caused the Boeing 747 G-ONEE incident on 8 February 2024?\",\"acceptedAnswer\":{\"@type\":\"Answer\",\"text\":\"Water. Rain entered the main cargo deck of One Air Boeing 747-433 G-ONEE through the L1 door, which had been left open overnight at London Heathrow during maintenance. The water reached Generator Control Units 1 and 4 in the E1\/E2 rack beneath the cargo deck floor, and the wet GCUs sensed non-existent electrical faults and commanded contactors to open, isolating AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 4. The AAIB was unable to determine the exact path the water took, but found multiple weaknesses in the aircraft\u2019s water ingress protection.\"}},{\"@type\":\"Question\",\"name\":\"Is G-ONEE a Boeing 747-400F?\",\"acceptedAnswer\":{\"@type\":\"Answer\",\"text\":\"No. The AAIB designates it a Boeing 747-433, a 747-400 series airframe built in 1991 as a passenger aircraft and converted to a freighter (747-400 SF) by Israel Aerospace Industries in 2006. A 747-400F is a factory-built freighter, and Boeing\u2019s own conversion is the 747-400 BCF. The distinction matters because the AAIB addressed two of its four safety recommendations to Boeing and two to Israel Aerospace Industries.\"}},{\"@type\":\"Question\",\"name\":\"Why did all three airspeed indicators fail at the same time?\",\"acceptedAnswer\":{\"@type\":\"Answer\",\"text\":\"Because the common element was heating, not sensing. The Boeing 747-400 has four combined pitot-static probes feeding three independent airspeed displays, but the heaters for all four probes are powered from AC Bus 1 and AC Bus 4. When both buses were lost, no pitot probe on the aircraft had heat. Entering icing at about 12,000 ft, all three pitot tubes froze, and because the aircraft was descending, the trapped pitot pressure made every indicator under-read. This is a classic common-mode failure: redundant sensors defeated by a shared dependency.\"}},{\"@type\":\"Question\",\"name\":\"How steeply did G-ONEE descend during the unreliable airspeed event?\",\"acceptedAnswer\":{\"@type\":\"Answer\",\"text\":\"The autopilot, in flight level change mode, lowered the nose to chase an airspeed that was falsely decaying. The AAIB records a recorded pitch of 7.6&deg; nose-down with an associated rate of descent of approximately 6,240 ft\/min. When the aircraft exited icing at about 10,000 ft the captain\u2019s indicated airspeed jumped from 260 to 345 kt in four seconds, triggering an overspeed warning that peaked at 383 KIAS \u2014 18 kt above the VMO of 365 KIAS for that altitude, and lasting 55 seconds.\"}},{\"@type\":\"Question\",\"name\":\"Was anyone injured and was the aircraft damaged?\",\"acceptedAnswer\":{\"@type\":\"Answer\",\"text\":\"No. There were five crew on board G-ONEE and no cargo. The AAIB records no injuries and no damage. The crew declared a PAN, later upgraded it to a MAYDAY, managed a subsequent flap drive problem and landed safely on Runway 06 at Amsterdam Schiphol, roughly 85 minutes after departing Heathrow. Because the 18 kt overspeed fell below the operator\u2019s 20 kt threshold, no overspeed inspection was required.\"}},{\"@type\":\"Question\",\"name\":\"What did the AAIB recommend after the G-ONEE investigation?\",\"acceptedAnswer\":{\"@type\":\"Answer\",\"text\":\"Four safety recommendations, issued in pairs. Recommendations 2026-013 and 2026-014 ask Boeing Commercial Airplanes and Israel Aerospace Industries respectively to introduce a repetitive inspection of the drip shield over the E1 and E2 racks in the Main Equipment Centre. Recommendations 2026-015 and 2026-016 ask the same two organisations to introduce a detailed repetitive inspection of the floor panel seals, waterproof tape, power drive units and L1 door floor mat above and near the Main Equipment Centre. Until now the fibreglass reinforcing overcoat mandated by FAA Airworthiness Directive 2012-15-10 was treated as a terminating action, with no follow-up inspection required.\"}}]}<\/script><p><em>Sources: AAIB Bulletin AAIB-29853, &ldquo;Boeing 747-433, G-ONEE&rdquo;, published 3 September 2026; ATSB Transport Safety Report AO-2008-003 (VH-OJM); Boeing Service Bulletin SB-747-25A3555 and FAA Airworthiness Directive 2012-15-10 as quoted in the AAIB report; The Aviation Herald; FlightGlobal.<\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n<div style=\"background:#f0f4ff;border-left:4px solid #5C91FF;padding:16px 20px;margin:32px 0 8px\">\r\n<p style=\"margin:0 0 8px;font-weight:600;color:#333\">Related Posts<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><a href=\"https:\/\/migflug.com\/afterburner\/air-india-a320neo-triple-hydraulic-failure-aaib-preliminary-report\/\">Air India A320neo Lost All Three Hydraulic Systems at 36,000 Feet<\/a><\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><a href=\"https:\/\/migflug.com\/afterburner\/british-airways-a320-alternate-law-stall-heathrow-aaib-2026\/\">British Airways A320 Alternate Law Stall Warning at Heathrow<\/a><\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><a href=\"https:\/\/migflug.com\/afterburner\/x-31-efm-crash-1995-pitot-icing-edwards\/\">X-31 EFM: The Pitot Icing Crash at Edwards in 1995<\/a><\/p>\r\n<p style=\"margin:4px 0\"><a href=\"https:\/\/migflug.com\/afterburner\/turkish-airlines-981-dc-10-cargo-door-ermenonville-1974\/\">Turkish Airlines 981: The Cargo Door That Killed 346 People<\/a><\/p>\r\n<\/div>\r\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The AAIB final report on Boeing 747-433 G-ONEE: rain through an open L1 door at Heathrow drowned two generator control units, killed AC buses 1 and 4, removed all pitot heating and left the crew with three airspeed indicators that were all wrong.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":27,"featured_media":21667022,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"editor_notices":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[665,670],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-21667619","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-aviation-world","category-news"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.4 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Boeing 747 G-ONEE: Open Door, Rain, No Airspeed | MiGFlug<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"The AAIB final report on Boeing 747 G-ONEE: rain through an open cargo door killed two AC buses, all pitot heating and every airspeed indication.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" 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