Aircraft Sikorsky HH-60W Jolly Green II — combat search and rescue helicopter
Event Two HH-60Ws participated in the rescue of a downed F-15E crew inside Iran, April 2–4, 2026
Damage Both helicopters struck by small arms fire; crew members sustained minor injuries
Rescue Scale 155 aircraft involved in the second extraction (4 bombers, 64 fighters, 48 tankers, 13 rescue aircraft)
Current Defence AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System — passive warning only, no active countermeasures
Gap No infrared countermeasure system to defeat heat-seeking missiles (MANPADS)
Planned Fix CIRCM or DAIRCM — laser-based systems that blind incoming missile seekers
Status Request for Information issued April 7, 2026
A Warning System That Can Only Watch
The Air Force fielded the HH-60W with the AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System — a sensor suite that detects the ultraviolet bloom of an incoming missile’s rocket motor and alerts the crew. What it does not do is stop the missile. The crew gets a warning tone and a direction indicator. After that, they are on their own. In practical terms, this means the pilot must manoeuvre — hard turns, terrain masking, flare dispensing — to break a missile’s lock. Against older, less agile MANPADS, that can work. Against modern infrared seekers with counter-countermeasure logic, it is a bet with deteriorating odds. The Air Force acknowledged the vulnerability in blunt language. Its RFI stated that the lack of infrared countermeasures “significantly increases the risk of infrared guided missile engagement, jeopardizing mission success, aircraft survivability, and crew safety.” That is about as close to an admission of failure as Pentagon procurement documents get.CIRCM and DAIRCM: Blinding the Seeker
The fix involves a category of system that already exists and already works on other helicopters. The Common Infrared Countermeasure (CIRCM) and the Distributed Aperture Infrared Countermeasure (DAIRCM) both use low-energy lasers to jam an incoming missile’s infrared seeker. When a heat-seeking missile locks onto a helicopter’s engine exhaust, the countermeasure system detects the launch, identifies the incoming threat, and fires a precisely aimed laser beam into the missile’s guidance optics. The laser overwhelms the seeker with false signals, causing the missile to lose its track and veer off course. The entire sequence — detection, identification, engagement — takes seconds. The Army has fielded CIRCM on its Apache and Black Hawk fleets for years. The Air Force’s decision not to include a similar system on the HH-60W from the start was a cost and schedule trade-off that looked reasonable on paper and nearly proved fatal in Iran.The Rescue That Exposed the Gap
The April 2–4 rescue operation was the most complex combat search and rescue mission since the Balkan wars. Two F-15E crew members went down over Iranian territory after their Strike Eagle was hit, triggering an extraction that eventually involved 155 aircraft — four bombers, 64 fighters, 48 refueling tankers, and 13 dedicated rescue platforms. The HH-60Ws penetrated deep into Iranian airspace, collected the downed aircrew, and fought their way out under fire. Both helicopters took small-arms hits. Crew members were wounded. The aircraft remained flyable — a testament to the Jolly Green II’s combat resilience — but the absence of an active missile defence system hung over the entire operation like unfinished business.



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