You have seen the evidence yourself. A lavatory door taped shut with a laminated card on it reading INOPERATIVE. A reading light that does nothing. A seatback screen stuck on the safety video. Most passengers read these as signs of a tired airline cutting corners.
They are the opposite. Each one is the visible end of a formal, regulated process with its own approval chain, its own legal clock and its own paperwork, and the placard is there because a regulator insists on it. Airliners are allowed to depart with specific things broken, for a specific number of days, under specific conditions — and the document that says which things is one of the more remarkable artefacts in civil aviation.
It is called the Minimum Equipment List. The master version for the Boeing 737 family runs to 330 pages. Among the things it permits: one of two thrust reversers locked out, the auxiliary power unit removed from the aircraft altogether, and every autopilot on board inoperative for up to three days.
Datos rápidos
- Qué es: The Minimum Equipment List, the operator-specific list of equipment that may be inoperative at departure
- US rule: 14 CFR 121.628, “Inoperable instruments and equipment”, for airline operations; 14 CFR 91.213 for general aviation
- EU rule: ORO.MLR.105 of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, with EASA CS-MMEL setting the master list standard
- Source document: The Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL), issued per aircraft type; the FAA 737 MMEL, revision 63a of 27 May 2026, runs to 330 pages
- Hierarchy: An operator’s MEL may be more restrictive than the MMEL, never less
- Repair categories: A: as specified. B: 3 calendar days. C: 10 calendar days. D: 120 calendar days. The day of discovery is excluded
- Extensions: FAA: one self-approved extension, categories B and C only. EASA: categories B, C and D
- Legal effect: An approved MEL “constitutes an approved change to the type design without requiring recertification”
- Related list: The Configuration Deviation List, for externally exposed non-structural parts that may be missing
The rule that makes it legal
The American text is short and worth reading properly. 14 CFR 121.628 — note the heading says “Inoperable”, while the general-aviation section 91.213 says “Inoperative”; the regulations are not consistent with themselves — opens: “No person may take off an airplane with inoperable instruments or equipment installed unless the following conditions are met.” The conditions are that an approved Minimum Equipment List exists for that airplane and that the operator holds operations specifications authorising its use.
Then comes the sentence that tells you what the MEL really is. “An approved Minimum Equipment List, as authorized by the operations specifications, constitutes an approved change to the type design without requiring recertification.” Invoking the MEL is not a waiver and not an exception. It changes, in law, what the aircraft is certified to be.
The general-aviation route goes further still. Under 91.213(a)(2), “The Minimum Equipment List and the letter of authorization constitute a supplemental type certificate for the aircraft.” For aircraft operating without an MEL at all, 91.213(d) offers a much cruder path: the inoperative item is either removed and its cockpit control placarded, or simply “Deactivated and placarded ‘Inoperative’”. That is where the sticker on the lavatory door comes from.
The same section also closes the door on the obvious abuse. Equipment may not be included in a Minimum Equipment List if it is “specifically or otherwise required by the airworthiness requirements under which the airplane is type certificated and which are essential for safe operations under all operating conditions”, or if it is required operative by an airworthiness directive.
MMEL, MEL, CDL: who writes what
Three documents, routinely confused. The Master Minimum Equipment List is produced per aircraft type by a Flight Operations Evaluation Board chaired by the regulator. It is the ceiling. The operator’s own MEL is built from it, approved by that operator’s principal inspector, and may be more restrictive than the master list but never less. The Configuration Deviation List is a third thing entirely, approved not by the flight-operations side of the regulator but by the aircraft-certification side, and it lives in the Airplane Flight Manual.
The master list is a public document, and it is far stranger than most people expect. Here is one page of it.

Read the columns and the structure becomes obvious. Item 78-01, Thrust Reverser Systems. Repair category C. Two installed. One required for dispatch. And in the remarks column, the conditions: (M)(O), one may be inoperative provided the reverser is locked in the forward thrust position and appropriate performance adjustments are applied.
A, B, C, D — and a clock longer than it looks
Every relief item carries a repair category, and the categories are the same letters on both sides of the Atlantic. Category A has no standard interval; the time limit is written into the item itself. Category B is three calendar days. Category C is ten. Category D is 120.
The detail that catches people out is that the day of discovery does not count, and the last day runs to midnight. The FAA’s own worked example: a category C item recorded at 10 a.m. on 26 January starts its clock on 27 January and expires at 23:59:59 on 5 February. Ten days is, in practice, about eleven and a half.
EASA is the only one of the two that defines what qualifies an item for the 120-day box, and the test is about the crew rather than the hardware: the absence of the item must not adversely affect crew workload, the crew must not rely on it routinely or continuously, and their training, habit patterns and procedures must not depend on it.
Extensions are where the two regulators genuinely diverge. Both allow a single one-time extension, of no more than the original interval. The FAA permits it for categories B and C only, and the operator must tell its Flight Standards office within 24 hours. EASA permits it for categories B, C and D, requires the people authorised to grant one to be listed in advance by appointment and name, and gives the operator a month to notify. The FAA attaches a warning to the privilege that is worth quoting in full: the agency may deny its use if abuse is evident.
What can actually be deferred
The coffee maker and the reading light are the cliché. The real list is considerably more interesting. All of the following are drawn from the FAA’s own master list for the 737 family.
A thrust reverser. Category C, two installed, one required for dispatch. Locked in the forward thrust position, with performance recalculated. Ten days, extendable once to twenty.
The auxiliary power unit. Category C, one installed, zero required for dispatch: “Except for ETOPS, may be inoperative provided procedures do not require its use.” A companion item allows the APU to be physically removed from the aeroplane, provided the system is deactivated, the compartment is inspected after the first flight and then every 100 flight hours, and the missing unit is accounted for in the weight and balance.
Every autopilot on board. Category B, number required for dispatch zero, except for ETOPS, provided approach minima and enroute operations do not require one and the number and length of sectors is acceptable to the flight crew. A scheduled passenger flight may legally depart hand-flown, for up to three days, with the regulator leaving the sector count to the crew’s judgement. The master list attaches a note urging operators to repair the autopilot early in the interval in light of weather, traffic density and other inoperative systems.
An engine fire-detection loop. Category C, four installed, two required, except for ETOPS beyond 120 minutes, provided the remaining loops are verified once each flight day.
Wheel-well fire detection, and this one has the most vivid proviso in the document: it may be inoperative provided the system is deactivated, performance adjustments are applied, and the landing gear remains extended for ten minutes after takeoff. Lose the detector and you fly the first ten minutes with the gear hanging out, so that a fire would announce itself.
And the one every passenger has met: the lavatory. Category C, deferrable provided the associated components are deactivated or isolated to prevent leaks and the door is secured closed and placarded “INOPERATIVE – DO NOT ENTER”. The words on that laminated card are written into a federal document.
The deferral comes with homework
Those (M) and (O) markers in the remarks column are not decoration. (M) is a maintenance procedure that must be completed before the aircraft operates. (O) is an operations procedure, normally carried out by the flight crew, required when planning for or flying with the item inoperative. European law makes the ordering explicit: the maintenance procedure comes before operating, the operations procedure may be a planning action.
Deferrals also cost something operationally. An MEL item can impose limits on cargo loading, flight controls, landing gear and steering, autoflight capability, electrical power, lighting, oxygen, auxiliary power — and extended operations. Where a deferral affects performance, altitude capability, weight or fuel, the dispatcher must recalculate the flight plan and issue a new or amended release.
The clearest public example comes from an unexpected place. In its report on the Alaska Airlines 737-9 door-plug accident of January 2024, the NTSB records in a footnote that at the time of the accident the aeroplane was barred from extended-range operations because of a deferred aft fuel boost pump under the airline’s minimum equipment list. One deferred pump, and a twin-engined airliner comes off its over-water routes.
There is a subtler trap, too. Where the remarks column says an item is “considered inoperative”, a perfectly serviceable second item must be treated as broken for dispatch and flight purposes, and may not be used, until the original deferred item is repaired. Defer one thing and you can lose two.
The Configuration Deviation List: parts that may simply be absent
The MEL covers things that do not work. The CDL covers things that are not there. In the FAA’s own history of it, the Configuration Deviation List evolved from what was candidly called the “missing parts list” — a list of non-structural external parts found missing after flight. It allows continued operation with externally exposed non-structural parts absent, by defining restrictions, limitations or performance penalties.
Three things make it different from the MEL. It is produced by the aircraft manufacturer and approved by the certification side of the regulator, not by flight standards — it will not even appear on the list of effective pages of an operator’s MEL. It is not required for certification at all; a manufacturer may simply choose not to write one. And instead of a three-or-ten-day clock it carries performance penalties: weights reduced, speeds capped, the limitation placarded in the cockpit in clear view of the pilot-in-command and written onto the dispatch release.

Where it goes wrong
The system is sound. It is also, like every system, capable of being used for the wrong reason, and the clearest public account of that is a British one.
On 12 October 2018 a Boeing 737-4Q8 freighter, G-JMCR, was descending towards East Midlands at night with its left engine generator already deferred when the crew met an unusual spread of electrical failures. The right generator’s control unit had been incorrectly secured in its mounting tray and had disconnected in flight. The aircraft landed safely. The Air Accidents Investigation Branch then went looking at how the first generator came to be deferred in the first place.
What it found was twelve days of electrical faults, engineers repeatedly recording that the aircraft needed proper downtime to investigate, fault-finding stopped six times because there was not enough time in the turnaround, a deferred defect raised at the operator’s own main engineering base without the cause having been identified, and then a rectification interval extension granted — while the aircraft was in Oslo — to stretch that deferral further.
The AAIB issued six safety recommendations, one of them directed at the operator’s policy for approving and clearing MEL entries and rectification interval extensions. EASA’s own guidance material had already said the quiet part out loud: the MEL is an alleviating document, its purpose is not to encourage operation with inoperative equipment, and continued operation in that condition should be minimised.
A second AAIB case makes a different point. On 18 June 2021 a Boeing 787-8, G-ZBJB, was on a stand at Heathrow being prepared for a cargo flight. Three nose landing gear solenoid faults had appeared, on top of an existing deferred defect for a door solenoid from five days earlier. The dispatch deviation guide confirmed the faults could be deferred — provided the landing gear was recycled to confirm the nose gear doors worked. Downlock pins were fitted to stop the gear retracting. One pin had gone into the wrong hole, into the downlock link apex pin bore rather than the downlock pin hole. When the lever was selected up, the nose gear retracted and the aircraft fell onto its nose.
The deferral was entirely legal. The accident happened while performing the maintenance procedure the deferral required. The (M) is not a formality; it is a maintenance action with its own risk, carried out against a departure time.
What may never be deferred
The hard boundary is the regulation itself, and the best plain-language statement of the principle is European. EASA’s prescribed master-list preamble explains that the document covers items the agency finds may be inoperative while an acceptable level of safety is maintained, and then adds the line that settles the matter: “it does not contain obviously required items such as wings, flaps, and rudders.” The same preamble is explicit that everything related to airworthiness and operational regulation that is not listed in the master list must be operative, and that the MEL cannot deviate from airworthiness directives.
Below the MEL there is one further layer, and it is not a loophole so much as a last resort: an aircraft that cannot be dispatched under any list may still be flown, empty and under conditions, on a special flight permit.
None of which quite prepares you for the ordinary reality. Somewhere in the airline’s system there is a person whose whole job is tracking how many items are deferred on each aircraft, why each one is still open, how long it has been open and when it will be fixed — and the FAA requires that programme to exist in writing. The placard on the lavatory door is the only part of it you will ever see.
Sources: 14 CFR 121.628 and 14 CFR 91.213, read at eCFR; FAA draft Advisory Circular 120-MEL, “Development and Use of an Operator’s MEL, NEF Program, and CDL”, coordination copy; FAA Master Minimum Equipment List, Boeing 737, revision 63a, 27 May 2026; EASA Easy Access Rules for Air Operations, ORO.MLR.105 and its AMC and GM; EASA CS-MMEL Issue 2, Annex I to ED Decision 2020/012/R; AAIB Bulletin 10/2019, Boeing 737-4Q8 G-JMCR; AAIB Bulletin 12/2022, ref AAIB-27411, Boeing 787-8 G-ZBJB; NTSB Aviation Investigation Report AIR-25-04; National Business Aviation Association.




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