Deep inside the autothrottle of every Boeing 737 sits a small piece of logic with a long name: the cruise thrust split monitor. It exists for one scenario. If one engine is pushing much harder than the other and the autopilot is quietly fighting the resulting roll, the monitor is supposed to notice and kick the autothrottle off before things get worse.
On Wednesday 18 November 2026, the US Federal Aviation Administration filed an immediately adopted airworthiness directive saying that on some 737 Next Generation jets, that safeguard may not work as intended. AD 2026-23-04, signed on 10 November and released for public inspection on 18 November, orders repeated tests on 737-600, -700, -700C, -800 and -900 aircraft. It is due to be published in the Federal Register on Friday 20 November.
Datos rápidos
- Directive: FAA AD 2026-23-04 (Amendment 39-23521), final rule with request for comments
- Aeronave: Boeing 737-600, -700, -700C, -800 and -900 identified in Boeing Alert Safety Advisory 737-BSA-22-001
- US fleet affected: 300 aircraft, FAA estimate
- Sistema: Autothrottle cruise thrust split monitor (MONFD)
- Problema: Potential latent loss of, or erroneous, spoiler sensor position data
- Required action: Repetitive aileron BITE tests of the digital flight control system, plus on-condition actions
- Costo: 2 work-hours, $170 per aircraft per test cycle
- Fechas: Signed 10 Nov 2026; filed 18 Nov; due for publication 20 Nov; effective 15 days after publication
What the FAA found
The directive was prompted by a review of the autothrottle’s cruise thrust split monitor, known in Boeing shorthand as MONFD. The FAA says the review found a potential for latent loss of spoiler sensor position data, or erroneous spoiler sensor position data.
That matters because the monitor relies on the spoilers. When thrust becomes asymmetric, the autopilot counters the roll with ailerons and flight spoilers. By watching how far the spoilers are deflected, the system can infer that something is wrong with the thrust and disengage the autothrottle. Feed it bad spoiler data, or none, and it may never trigger.
The key word is “latent”. A sensor fault of this kind can sit undetected through normal operations, leaving a protection the crew assumes is there quietly switched off until the day it is needed.

The fix: test, and keep testing
The AD does not require new parts. It makes mandatory the actions marked “required for compliance” in Boeing Alert Safety Advisory 737-BSA-22-001, dated 30 October 2026: repetitive aileron built-in test equipment (BITE) tests of the digital flight control system. If a test fails, operators must address the failure and repeat the test until it passes.
The FAA estimates that 300 US-registered aircraft are affected. Each test takes about two work-hours, which the agency costs at $170 per aircraft per test cycle, or $51,000 per cycle across the US fleet. The compliance intervals sit in Boeing’s advisory rather than in the AD text, with one change: where Boeing counts from the advisory’s issue date, the AD counts from its own effective date.
The FAA skipped the usual notice-and-comment process, saying the risk to the flying public justified immediate adoption and that the compliance time is shorter than the time needed for public comment. The rule takes effect 15 days after publication, and the agency will still accept comments for 45 days after publication.
The Boeing 737 Technical Channel explains how the 737 controls roll with ailerons and flight spoilers, the surfaces whose position data feeds the thrust split monitor.
An old problem, now on the NG
This is not the first time the FAA has gone after the thrust split monitor. In October 2022 it ordered repetitive BITE tests on older 737-300, -400 and -500 Classics after finding that a spoiler sensor failure could go undetected by the autothrottle computer. FlightGlobal reported at the time that only 21 aircraft on the US register were affected.
A second directive followed in December 2024 for the 737-300 and -400. That one addressed flight control rigging tolerances that could leave spoiler deflection below the level needed to engage the monitor, and required rewiring, a new housing assembly and removal of a mechanical aileron force limiter.
The concern has a grim backdrop. Indonesia’s investigation into the January 2021 crash of Sriwijaya Air Flight 182, a 737-500, concluded in its final report of November 2022 that thrust asymmetry had built up and that the cruise thrust split monitor activated too late, most plausibly because of an erroneous spoiler position signal. The new AD for the NG does not mention that accident.
Why 300 jets matters
The 737NG is no longer built as an airliner, but it remains a mainstay of many US passenger and cargo fleets. Three hundred affected aircraft is a fraction of the US-registered NG fleet, since applicability is limited to aircraft identified in Boeing’s advisory.
For operators, the burden is small: a couple of hours of maintenance time per test. For the system, the point is bigger. A protection that only matters on a very bad day must be proven to work on all the ordinary ones, and once the AD takes effect in early December, operators of 300 US-registered 737NGs will have to keep proving it.
Sources: Federal Register / FAA (AD 2026-23-04, public inspection document 2026-23697; AD 2022-21-05; AD 2024-23-03), FlightGlobal, AviationPros, Wikipedia (Sriwijaya Air Flight 182)
Header photo: Acroterion / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0




0 Comments