Six characters. Something like 8EI29V. It is printed on your boarding pass, repeated in the confirmation email, stamped on your bag tag and encoded in the barcode. Most people treat it as a harmless reference number, somewhere between a receipt and a cloakroom ticket.
It is neither. That string is the key to a record that knows your name, who you are travelling with, what you paid and how, which seat you asked for, what you wanted to eat, every change you have ever made to the booking, and — if you handed over a passport — its number, country and expiry date. Governments on both sides of the Atlantic take a copy of that record and keep it for years after your airline has thrown its own away.
And there is a question people actually type into Google about it, which this piece will answer plainly: no, you cannot look up who is on a flight. Here is what is really in a Passenger Name Record, who gets to read it, and why the six characters guarding it were never designed to be a password.
Informazioni rapide
- Che cos'è: The Passenger Name Record, the airline’s commercial file for one booking
- Minimum contents: Five mandatory elements, taught in the trade as PRINT: Phone, Received-from, Itinerary, Name, Ticketing
- The code: A record locator, six alphanumeric characters by near-universal convention — though the interline standard allows up to 20
- How many codes: 36 to the power of 6 is about 2.18 billion combinations, and real systems use fewer
- Reused?: Yes. Travelport documents that record locators are recycled once a booking file has been purged
- EU government copy: 19 data elements under Directive (EU) 2016/681; identifiable for 6 months, deleted at 5 years
- US government copy: Up to 5 years active plus up to 10 years dormant under the EU–US PNR Agreement
- Airline’s own copy: Travelport+ purges the booking file 24 hours after the last segment; agency retrieval stops at 13 months
- Can the public see it?: No. There is no lawful route for a member of the public to obtain a passenger list
Five things, and your booking becomes real
A PNR is not an airline invention so much as a travel-industry one. It lives in a global distribution system — Amadeus, Sabre or Travelport — and it cannot be saved at all until five things are present. The trade teaches them as a mnemonic, PRINT: Phone, Received-from, Itinerary, Name, Ticketing.
Travelport’s own documentation is blunt about it: a booking file cannot be saved unless it includes all of the required fields, and besides the itinerary there are four others — name, phone, ticketing and received. Sabre’s developer portal teaches the identical five under the identical mnemonic. “Received-from” is the one that surprises people: the record has to say who asked for the booking, because the file is a legal record of instructions as much as a reservation.
A small vocabulary note for anyone who ends up reading vendor documentation. Travelport does not call it a PNR at all. Its own term is a booking file, and its top-level object is a Universal Record that can hold booking data from more than one supplier. Same animal, different zoo.
Nineteen things the government version holds
Everything above is the minimum. What an airline actually accumulates is far larger, and the clearest published inventory of it is the European one. Annex I of Directive (EU) 2016/681 lists 19 categories of PNR data that carriers must hand over, and reading it is an education.
It runs: the record locator; the date of reservation or ticket issue; the dates of intended travel; names; address and contact information; all forms of payment information including billing address; the complete itinerary; frequent-flyer information; travel agency or agent; travel status including check-in, no-show and go-show; split or divided PNR information; general remarks, which the Directive expands to cover unaccompanied minors under 18 including the child’s name, gender, age, languages spoken and the names and contact details of the guardians at both ends; ticketing field information; seat number; code-share information; all baggage information; the number and names of other travellers on the record; any Advance Passenger Information collected, including passport type, number, country of issue and expiry, nationality, gender and date of birth; and, finally, all historical changes to items 1 to 18.
That last item is the one that does the damage. A PNR is not a snapshot. It is a log.

Six characters, 2.18 billion combinations, and no password
Here is the thing almost everyone gets wrong, including a good deal of published coverage: there is no IATA or ATA standard that mandates six alphanumeric characters. Six is a convention of the host systems. Travelport documents it for Travelport+ — a six-character code of letters and numbers, assigned the first time a booking file is ended, and unchanged however many times the file is retrieved or modified. But the interline standard that actually carries the locator between carriers and governments, IATA’s PNRGOV implementation guide, specifies the reservation control number as alphanumeric up to 20 characters, and allows the field to repeat up to eight more times.
Which means a single trip can carry up to nine different booking references: the travel agency’s, the ticketing carrier’s, the operating carrier’s, and a ground handler’s departure control system inventing its own when it cannot see the reservation. Each is in principle a key to the same person.
Six characters from the 36-symbol alphabet gives about 2.18 billion combinations, which sounds comfortable until you notice three things. The codes are not secret: they are printed on the boarding pass, on the bag tag, in the email, and inside the bar-coded boarding pass barcode standardised as IATA Resolution 792. They are not random: the researchers who went looking found that the systems use uppercase only, that at least one avoids the digits 1 and 0 to prevent confusion with I and O, and that two of them issue codes sequentially. And for a long time nothing stopped anyone trying thousands of them from a single address.
Nohl and Nemanja Nikodijevic presented the work at the 33rd Chaos Communication Congress in Hamburg on 27 December 2016, under the title “Where in the World Is Carmen Sandiego?”. Their write-up put the problem in one sentence: the most important security feature lacking from all three systems is a proper way to authenticate travellers. The booking code is not a second factor. It is the only factor, and it is printed on a piece of paper you throw in the seat pocket.
The full hour from the Chaos Computer Club’s own channel. It remains the best public account of how these systems actually work.
What happens when the code is the only key
Three years later it was still happening. In January 2019 the researcher Noam Rotem found that the link EL AL sent customers to manage their booking took the record locator as a parameter in the address: change the parameter, read somebody else’s booking. There was no brute-force protection behind it either.
Rotem also made the point that matters most for ordinary travellers: airlines send these codes in unencrypted email, and people photograph their boarding passes and post them. Amadeus fixed the specific flaw quickly. Whether the wider class of problem has been fixed is genuinely unclear — the industry says it has hardened these flows, and no published re-test of the three systems exists.
It is also why a breach of booking data matters more than a breach of, say, a mailing list. When airBaltic disclosed this month that roughly 618,000 bookings had been exposed through an external IT provider, the thing exposed was not a list of email addresses. It was a set of records of the kind described above. Afterburner covered that story here: airBaltic’s data breach and what was in the 618,000 bookings.
Then the governments take a copy
Directive (EU) 2016/681 was adopted on 27 April 2016. It requires air carriers to push the Annex I data to a Passenger Information Unit in the member state the flight lands in or departs from, twice: between 24 and 48 hours before departure, and again immediately after the doors close. Crucially, carriers must transfer the listed data only “to the extent that they have already collected such data in the normal course of their business”. PNR is a commercial record governments read, not a government form they make you fill in.
The data is retained for five years. After six months it is depersonalised by masking out the identifying elements — names, contact details, payment information, frequent-flyer data, identifying general remarks and any API data — and unmasking it after that requires approval from a judicial or equivalent authority.
The Directive as drafted covers flights in and out of the EU. Intra-EU flights are an option member states can take up under Article 2, and in practice nearly all of them did. That is precisely what landed the whole scheme in front of the Court of Justice.
The Court of Justice read it very narrowly
On 21 June 2022 the Grand Chamber ruled in Case C-817/19, Ligue des droits humains. It did not strike the Directive down. It did something more awkward: it upheld the Directive on condition that its powers are read restrictively, and then set out what restrictively means.
The Court described the scheme as introducing “a surveillance regime that is continuous, untargeted and systematic”. It held that in the absence of a genuine and present or foreseeable terrorist threat, EU law precludes applying PNR processing to all intra-EU flights. It held that passenger information units may not use self-learning machine-learning systems capable of changing the assessment process without human review. And on retention it was explicit: the Directive precludes national legislation providing for a general five-year retention period applied indiscriminately to all air passengers. The first six months, it said, is a different matter; beyond that, keeping everybody’s record is not limited to what is strictly necessary.
Nearly three years after the judgment the Board was still reporting a substantial lack of implementation effort across member states. The Commission, for its part, says it is evaluating the Directive. There is no published proposal to rewrite it.
The American side: APIS, Secure Flight, and fifteen years
The United States runs two separate things that are routinely confused with PNR and with each other. The Advance Passenger Information System, under 19 CFR 122.49a for arrivals and 122.75a for departures, is a closed list of 19 fields the carrier must transmit no later than 30 minutes before the aircraft’s doors are closed and secured — name, date of birth, gender, citizenship, residence, travel document details, address in the United States and so on. The carrier is also made the document checker: it must compare what it collected against the actual travel document.
TSA Secure Flight, under 49 CFR Part 1560, is a different closed list of 11 items, of which three — full name, date of birth and sex — the passenger must supply or the carrier may not submit anything at all. The widely repeated line that Secure Flight data goes to TSA 72 hours before the flight is wrong: the 72 hours is the deadline for collecting it from the passenger. The transmission schedule is set in each carrier’s own implementation plan and is not published.
Both lists ask for the record locator. The six characters are one of the keys the US government files alongside your identity data. And PNR itself, transferred under the 2012 EU–US agreement, is held by the Department of Homeland Security for up to five years in an active database, depersonalised after the first six months, and then moved to a dormant database for up to a further ten. Fifteen years, of which six months are directly identifiable.

No, you cannot look up who is on a flight
This is the question the search data is screaming, so let us be unambiguous. There is no public route to a passenger manifest. Every disclosure obligation in the aviation rulebooks runs to governments, and every one is a closed list: APIS, Secure Flight, the EU Directive, the bilateral agreements. None of them contains a provision for disclosure to a member of the public. For European carriers the GDPR supplies the prohibition directly, since curiosity is not one of the six lawful bases for processing.
The nearest thing to an exception is instructive rather than helpful. In the United States, 14 CFR Part 243 obliges covered airlines to collect the full name of every passenger who is a US citizen — and a US citizen who will not give one may be refused boarding — plus a contact name and telephone number. That contact information is kept confidential and released only to the State Department, the NTSB on request, and the Department of Transportation. In an aviation disaster the airline must send the compilation to the State Department within three hours. Not to the press. Not to the public.
Practice elsewhere differs sharply. After the crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines jet at Aktau in December 2024, the airline itself published the passenger and crew lists. A US or EU carrier would be prohibited from doing the same thing.
There is one genuine asymmetry worth knowing about, and it is not a loophole for the public. Inside a global distribution system, a travel agent really can retrieve bookings by surname — Travelport documents the command for it, including searching across branch offices. The boundary is the agency, not the system. Which is exactly why the researchers’ discovery that agency logins were protected by passwords like a two-letter code plus a date mattered so much.
Two details to leave you with
First: the code is recycled. Travelport’s own documentation states that record locators are reused once a booking file has been purged, and that if more than one past-date file shares a locator the system simply shows a list. The string you have been treating as the permanent identifier of your trip is a reusable slot.
Second, and this is the shape of the whole thing: Travelport purges the live booking file 24 hours after the last segment ever held, and an agency can retrieve it as a past-date file for 13 months and then never again. Set that against five years at a European passenger information unit and up to fifteen at the Department of Homeland Security. The commercial original — the record the airline actually needed — is gone in a day. The copies outlive it by more than a decade.
Sources: Directive (EU) 2016/681 and its Annex I; Court of Justice of the European Union, Case C-817/19, Ligue des droits humains, judgment of 21 June 2022, and the Court’s Press Release No 105/22; Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use and transfer of passenger name records to the US Department of Homeland Security, OJ L 215, 11.8.2012; 19 CFR 122.49a and 122.75a; 49 CFR Part 1560; 14 CFR Part 243; IATA Bar Coded Boarding Pass Implementation Guide v7 and the PNRGOV EDIFACT Implementation Guide; Travelport Smartpoint Cloud documentation; Sabre developer portal; Security Research Labs; CSO Online; Security Affairs; European Data Protection Board.




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