On April 13, 2026, Air National Guard leaders delivered a stark message to Congress: the U.S. Air Force is “the oldest, the smallest, and the least ready in its 78-year history.” To fix that, they say, America needs to buy 100 new fighters per year. Currently, the Pentagon buys about 40–50. The gap is widening, and the clock is ticking.

The request came not from some fringe advocacy group, but from all 22 adjutants general commanding states with Guard fighter units—a unified cry from military leadership that signals just how acute the readiness crisis has become. They want a minimum of 72 aircraft annually (48 F-35s and 24 F-15EXs), but their preferred target is over 100. The last time the Air Force bought more than 72 fighters in a single year was 1998.

This isn’t about new programs or pipe dreams. It’s about the math of decline: the Guard operates roughly half the Air Force’s fighter inventory, but aging F-16Cs and F-15Cs are retiring faster than they’re being replaced. Even with an accelerated buy, full modernization could take a decade and a half.

The Ask: Triple the Buy, or Fall Behind

National Guard leaders didn’t mince words in their April statement to Congress. The 20 adjutants general—representing Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin—called for immediate action on fighter procurement.

Their letter emphasized that maintaining a credible deterrent and defense posture “requires robust investment in aircraft procurement” to modernize legacy systems. Specifically, they want:

• Minimum 72/year: 48 F-35A Lightning II + 24 F-15EX Eagle II
• Desired 100+/year: Mix of advanced fighters to accelerate the timeline

According to Brigadier General Shannon Smith of the Idaho Air National Guard, even buying 100 fighters annually would require 10–15 years to fully replace the legacy inventory. At today’s rate of 40–50, that timeline stretches to 20+ years—during which older aircraft will become increasingly expensive to maintain and operationally risky.

The Math: Retirements vs. Procurements

The numbers tell the story. The Air Force has been requesting:

• FY2024: 48 F-35s + 24 F-15EXs = 72 total
• FY2025: 42 F-35s + 18 F-15EXs = 60 total
• FY2026: 24 F-35s + 21 F-15EXs = 45 total
• FY2027: 38 F-35s + 24 F-15EXs = 62 total

Meanwhile, the Air Force must retire F-22 Raptors (production ended in 2011), older F-15C Eagles, and low-hour F-16Cs as they exceed their service lives. The Air National Guard—which provides 50% of the total tactical fighter inventory—bears the brunt of this aging fleet crisis. Many of its F-16s and F-15Cs have logged over 25 years of service.

Compounding the problem: Congress has also pushed the Air Force to develop the next-generation F-47 NGAD (Next Generation Air Dominance) fighter, which won’t arrive until the mid-2030s. That means the 2020s are a “bridge” decade where older platforms must stay active longer—or readiness sags.

What’s Being Built: F-35, F-15EX, and the Distant F-47

The Guard’s proposal assumes buys split between two proven platforms and one future airframe:

• F-35A Lightning II (5th generation): Stealth, sensor fusion, networked. Lockheed Martin is the sole supplier. Global production capacity sits at 156 aircraft/year across all variants and all assembly sites (Fort Worth, Italy, Japan). In 2025, Lockheed delivered a record 191 F-35s (some from backlog clearance), but the sustainable rate is capped at 156.
• F-15EX Eagle II (4.5 generation): Modern radar, long range, large payload. Boeing builds these. The EX is being integrated into Oregon, California, and Louisiana ANG squadrons. It’s a proven, available option that can ramp quickly.
• F-47 NGAD (6th generation): The Air Force’s future air dominance fighter, still in development. Not expected to enter service until the mid-2030s, leaving a 10+ year gap.

The industrial base can handle a 100/year goal, but just barely. Lockheed’s F-35 line is the bottleneck at 156 total (all services, all variants). If the Air Force wants 72 F-35As annually just for itself and the Guard, that’s nearly half of global capacity.

The Air National Guard’s Stake: Half the Fighter Force

Why should Congress care about the Guard’s aging fleet? Because the Air National Guard is not a reserve force in the traditional sense. Its combat squadrons are operational, deployable, and combat-coded. On any given day, ANG pilots and aircraft are engaged in:

• Continental air defense (homeland protection)
• Expeditionary operations (Middle East, Indo-Pacific)
• Training and qualification for allies
• Disaster response and civil support

The Guard’s fighter inventory represents roughly 50% of total USAF tactical fighter strength. If the Guard’s fleet becomes older and less capable, the entire Air Force’s ability to deter and fight erodes proportionally. Buying 100 fighters per year—about 50 F-35s for the Guard—is partly about keeping pace with demand.

The Industrial Capacity Question: Can We Build That Many?

Here’s the reality: sustained production of 100+ fighters per year is theoretically possible, but it requires:

• Lockheed F-35 capacity: 156/year (all three variants, global facilities). Increasing beyond that would require capital investment, new production lines, and years of ramp-up.
• Boeing F-15EX capacity: Currently 24–36/year; can likely scale to 48–60 with supply-chain smoothing.
• Supply chain resilience: Semiconductors, raw materials, skilled labor. Post-2025 supply constraints are easing, but new wars or crises could disrupt again.
• Sustained funding: 100 fighters/year × $100M/aircraft = ~$10 billion annually for fighter procurement alone. The 2026 defense budget accommodates this, but only if sustained through the decade.

The bigger constraint is political willingness and industrial investment cycles. The Pentagon and Congress would need to commit to multi-year contracts, guaranteeing offtakes and funding predictability. That’s easier in theory than in practice.

The Manned vs. Uncrewed Wild Card

The elephant in the room: the Air Force is also developing crewed-combat-aircraft (CCA) drones—uncrewed fighters that could supplement or replace some manned sorties. If CCAs mature faster and cheaper than new F-35As, the Guard’s 100/year ask might be offset. A combat package of (say) one pilot in an F-35 + four CCAs could deliver more firepower than buying six manned fighters.

The Guard’s letter doesn’t dismiss this possibility, but it emphasizes that today’s force structure and doctrine still depend on manned fighters. The transition to hybrid manned/unmanned operations will take 10–15 years, and legacy aircraft can’t make the cut that long.

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Sources: Air & Space Forces Magazine (April 13, 2026) “Guard Leaders Tell Congress the Air Force Needs 100 New Fighters a Year”; National Guard Bureau; U.S. Air Force fact sheets; Breaking Defense reporting on F-35 production rates; congressional testimony and DVIDS imagery archives.