On March 3, 2026, an Iranian ballistic missile struck one of the most valuable single pieces of military hardware the United States has ever deployed overseas. The target was not a warship, not an airfield, and not a command centre. It was a radar — a three-faced, solid-state phased-array system called the AN/FPS-132 Block 5, sitting inside a compound at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. The system cost $1.1 billion when it was sold to Qatar in 2013. Adjusted for inflation, that figure is closer to $2.1 billion today.
New photographs published by Al Jazeera on April 11 provide the clearest view yet of the damage. They show burnt components, exposed wiring, and the aftermath of firefighting operations around the radar site. Satellite imagery from Planet Labs, obtained by the Middlebury Institute, had already confirmed that at least one of the radar’s three array faces was hit. The ground-level photos suggest the damage may be more extensive than space-based imagery alone could reveal.
Quick Facts
System: AN/FPS-132 Block 5 (SSPARS) — Solid State Phased Array Radar System
Configuration: Three electronically steered phased-array faces · 360° azimuth coverage
Location: Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar
Mission: Ballistic missile early warning · Missile defence cueing · Space surveillance
Damaged: March 3, 2026 — Iranian retaliatory strike
What the AN/FPS-132 Actually Does
The AN/FPS-132 is not an ordinary radar. It belongs to a small family of strategic early warning systems — the kind that exist to give a nation minutes of warning before a ballistic missile arrives. The United States operates a handful of these systems worldwide: at Thule in Greenland, Clear in Alaska, Cape Cod in Massachusetts, Fylingdales in the United Kingdom, and at Al Udeid in Qatar. Each one watches a different arc of the sky. Together, they form an unblinking ring around the globe.
A THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) battery — one of the downstream interceptor systems that depends on the AN/FPS-132 radar for early warning cueing data. Without the radar, THAAD and Patriot batteries lose precious reaction time. Wikimedia Commons
With the radar degraded or offline, CENTCOM faces compressed warning timelines. Downstream interceptor batteries — Patriot, THAAD, and Aegis — lose the long-range cueing that gives them their greatest advantage. They must rely on shorter-range sensors and airborne platforms to fill the gap.
Replacement is not quick. The AN/FPS-132 is not an off-the-shelf item. Raytheon builds these systems on multi-year production timelines. Even if repair is possible — and the extent of damage to the electronics behind the damaged array face remains unclear — it could take months to years to restore full capability. Iran may not have destroyed the radar entirely, but it demonstrated that it could reach out and touch one of the most protected, most valuable pieces of American military infrastructure in the region.
The attack on the AN/FPS-132 was not just a strike on a building. It was a strike on the warning time that makes missile defence work. And that, more than the dollar figure, is what makes it a wake-up call.
Sources: The Aviationist, The War Zone, Planet Labs satellite imagery via the Middlebury Institute, Al Jazeera
On the morning of March 10, 1967, Captain Bob Pardo looked out the left side of his F-4 Phantom cockpit at another F-4 Phantom that was about to stop flying. The second jet belonged to his wingman, Captain Earl Aman, and it was bleeding fuel from a hole the size of a...
There is a sentence every student pilot in the world learns by heart, usually while sweating through their first night approach: red over white, you're alright. Say it out loud a few times. It rhymes, which is useful, because you are about to stake a 30-ton aircraft...
Everybody talks about the F-47. Every defence reporter, every think-tank panel, every congressional hearing. Boeing's clean-sheet sixth-generation fighter for the Air Force gets the headlines and the money and the Trump tweets. Meanwhile, across the river at Naval Air...
0 Comments