Wargame Tested: What the Air Force Needs for a China Fight

by | Apr 10, 2026 | Military Aviation, News | 0 comments

In a classified wargame room, Air Force planners just finished one of the most consequential simulations in recent memory. The question on the table: if the United States goes to war with China over Taiwan, what mix of aircraft gives the Air Force the best chance of winning? The results, reported by Air & Space Forces Magazine, are reshaping how the service thinks about its future force structure. The simulation tested different combinations of fighters, bombers, tankers, and autonomous drones across a range of Taiwan Strait scenarios — and the conclusions challenge several long-held assumptions about what matters most in a peer conflict. The stakes are not academic. Every budget decision the Air Force makes in the next five years will be shaped by what these wargames revealed.

Quick Facts

  • Source: Air & Space Forces Magazine reporting on new USAF wargame
  • Scenario: U.S.–China conflict over Taiwan Strait
  • Variables tested: Different aircraft mixes (fighters, bombers, tankers, CCAs)
  • Key platforms evaluated: F-35, F-15EX, B-21 Raider, CCA drone wingmen
  • Context: Results directly inform USAF budget and procurement decisions

The Tyranny of Distance

A war over Taiwan would be fundamentally different from anything the U.S. Air Force has fought since 1945. The distances are enormous. From the nearest major American air base in Japan, it is roughly 1,200 miles to the Taiwan Strait. From Guam, it is over 1,700. From Hawaii, it is 5,000. Those numbers dictate everything. Fighters with short legs need tanker support to reach the fight — and tankers are slow, vulnerable, and limited in number. Bombers can reach from further away but carry finite weapons loads. And all of it must operate within range of China’s vast arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles, which can strike air bases across the western Pacific. The wargame forced planners to confront these constraints honestly. How many tankers do you need to keep a fighter force in the air over Taiwan? How many bombers can you generate per day from bases that may be cratered by Chinese missiles? And what happens when you add hundreds of autonomous Collaborative Combat Aircraft to the mix?
USAF aircraft conduct operations
U.S. Air Force aircraft conduct operations over the CENTCOM area of responsibility. The same platforms are being wargamed for Pacific scenarios. U.S. Air Force photo / DVIDS

Mass Versus Quality

The wargame tested the central tension in modern air warfare: do you build a smaller force of exquisite, expensive platforms — or a larger force of cheaper, more expendable ones? The F-35A Lightning II is the Air Force’s premier fighter, but at $80 million per copy and $42,000 per flight hour, you cannot afford to buy or fly as many as you might need. The F-15EX Eagle II is cheaper to operate and carries a massive weapons load, but it is not stealthy and would face serious survivability challenges in a contested Chinese air defense environment. The B-21 Raider changes the equation with its long range and stealth, potentially allowing strikes from bases outside the reach of Chinese missiles. But the fleet is small and will remain so for years. Enter the Collaborative Combat Aircraft — autonomous drone wingmen designed to fly alongside manned fighters, absorbing risk and extending the reach of human pilots. At a fraction of the cost of a manned fighter, CCAs offer the one thing the Air Force desperately needs in a Pacific conflict: mass. More shooters, more sensors, more targets for Chinese air defenses to deal with.

What the Simulation Revealed

The specific results remain classified, but the broad conclusions are clear from reporting and public statements by Air Force leadership. Force mixes that relied heavily on CCAs consistently performed better than those that depended solely on manned aircraft. The ability to generate large numbers of autonomous platforms — even relatively simple ones — provided a decisive advantage in scenarios where Chinese missile salvos could suppress or destroy forward air bases. Tanker availability emerged as a critical chokepoint. In every scenario, the force ran short of aerial refueling capacity before it ran short of fighters. The implication is stark: buying more fighters without buying more tankers — or extending fighter range through other means — produces diminishing returns. Long-range strike from the B-21 proved essential in the early days of a conflict, when forward bases might be unavailable. But the simulation also showed that bombers alone cannot win the fight. Air superiority over the strait requires fighters, and fighters require tankers, and all of it requires bases that can absorb punishment and keep launching sorties. The wargame’s bottom line is uncomfortable for everyone: no single platform wins this war. Only the right combination — stealth bombers for the opening punch, tanker-supported fighters for sustained operations, and masses of CCAs to overwhelm Chinese defenses — gives the Air Force a credible path to victory. Sources: Air & Space Forces Magazine

Related Posts

The Pilot Who Stole the Foxbat

The Pilot Who Stole the Foxbat

On September 6, 1976, a Soviet MiG-25 Foxbat interceptor appeared on Japanese radar screens without warning. It was flying fast, low, and heading straight for Hakodate Airport on the northern island of Hokkaido. The pilot had not filed a flight plan. He had not...

Portugal Bets on a Tiny Italian Trainer

Portugal Bets on a Tiny Italian Trainer

The next generation of Portuguese military pilots will learn to fly in an aircraft that weighs less than a family car. On April 9, 2026, Tecnam and Spanish aviation services provider World Aviation announced that the Portuguese Air Force has selected the Tecnam...

0 Comments

Submit a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

en_USEnglish