On the night of April 25–26, Ukraine’s Security Service launched one of its most coordinated single-night operations of the entire war. SBU Special Operations Centre Alpha sent waves of attack drones against two of Russia’s most critical military installations in occupied Crimea simultaneously — the Belbek military airfield near Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet’s main naval base. By morning, a MiG-31 interceptor, three warships, a radar station, and multiple air defence nodes lay damaged. This was not a random harassment strike. Every target was selected to degrade Russia’s ability to project power from Crimea — fleet, aviation, intelligence, and air defence, all hit in a single coordinated window.

Belbek: Grounding Russia’s Eyes and Interceptors

Belbek airfield, located just north of Sevastopol, serves as the primary Russian air defence hub in western Crimea. It houses interceptor aircraft — including the MiG-31, Russia’s fastest operational fighter — and the radar infrastructure that feeds targeting data to surface-to-air missile batteries across the peninsula.

The MiG-31 is not a frontline dogfighter. It is a high-altitude, high-speed interceptor designed to patrol vast stretches of airspace and launch long-range missiles at incoming threats — cruise missiles, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft. Damaging one on the ground at Belbek does more than destroy an airframe worth an estimated $50–60 million. It degrades the air defence umbrella that protects every Russian asset in Crimea. The drones also struck the Cape M1 radar station and the headquarters of Russia’s radio-technical intelligence unit responsible for air defence coordination. Without functioning radar and command nodes, even intact SAM batteries become less effective — they can fire, but they cannot see as far or coordinate as precisely.

Sevastopol: Gutting the Fleet From Shore

Simultaneously, SBU drones struck the Black Sea Fleet’s main base in Sevastopol. Three warships took damage: the landing ships Yamal and Filchenkov, both Ropucha-class amphibious vessels, and the intelligence-gathering ship Ivan Khurs.

The Yamal and Filchenkov are among Russia’s remaining amphibious capability in the Black Sea — the kind of ships needed to resupply garrisons, move armoured vehicles, and project force across water. Every Ropucha-class ship put out of commission further erodes Russia’s ability to sustain operations along the Ukrainian coast. The Ivan Khurs is a different kind of loss. As a Vishnya-class intelligence ship, it collects electronic signals and communications intercepts across the Black Sea theatre. Damaging it blinds a key part of Russia’s maritime surveillance network precisely when Ukraine is ramping up naval drone operations along the Crimean coastline. The Lukomka training centre, also hit, handles readiness and tactical preparation for fleet personnel — a secondary target, but one that compounds the disruption.

The Operational Logic: Death by a Thousand Cuts

Ukraine has been systematically dismantling Russia’s military infrastructure in Crimea for over a year. The SBU’s Alpha unit, initially a counterterrorism force, has evolved into a precision strike arm capable of planning complex multi-target operations that would be familiar to any Western special operations commander. The April 25–26 operation exemplifies the approach: rather than concentrating firepower on a single high-value target, strike multiple interdependent systems simultaneously. Destroy the radar that guides the interceptor. Damage the interceptor that protects the fleet. Hit the fleet that projects power. Each target’s loss amplifies the damage to the others. For Russia, the math is increasingly grim. Crimea’s air defences are being degraded faster than they can be replenished. The Black Sea Fleet has already lost its flagship, the cruiser Moskva, multiple patrol boats, and a submarine to Ukrainian strikes over the course of the war. What remains is being pushed deeper into harbour — and even that is no longer safe. The question facing Moscow is no longer whether Crimea can be defended, but how much it is willing to spend trying. Sources: Ukrainska Pravda, Kyiv Independent, Kyiv Post, Euromaidan Press, Ukrinform, UNN