When Captain Jack Donovan was briefed on the mission — fly in the back seat of an F-100, home in on a North Vietnamese SAM site, and destroy it before it destroys you — his response entered aviation legend: “You want me to fly in the back of a tiny little jet with a crazy fighter pilot who thinks he’s invincible, home in on a SAM site, and shoot it before it shoots me? You gotta be shittin’ me.”
The acronym stuck. YGBSM became the unofficial motto of the Wild Weasels — the US Air Force’s SAM-hunting crews who volunteered to fly directly at the thing that was trying to kill everyone else.
Quick Facts — Wild Weasels
Mission: SEAD — Suppression of Enemy Air Defences
Motto: “First In, Last Out” (official) / YGBSM (unofficial)
First kill: 22 December 1965, Captains Allen Lamb & Jack Donovan
In July 1965, a Soviet SA-2 Guideline missile shot down an American F-4C over North Vietnam. It was the first SAM kill of the war, and it changed everything. US strike packages had been flying predictable routes at predictable altitudes — easy targets for a radar-guided missile that could reach 60,000 feet. Losses began to mount. The Air Force needed a way to kill the SAM sites. Nobody had ever done it before.
Wild Weasel I was born in November 1965: modified two-seat F-100F Super Sabres fitted with radar homing and warning receivers that could detect SAM radar emissions. The concept was simple and suicidal — fly toward the radar signal, provoke the site into shooting, and destroy it with bombs or the new AGM-45 Shrike anti-radiation missile, which homed on the SAM’s own radar beam.
First Kill
On 22 December 1965, Captains Allen Lamb (pilot) and Jack Donovan (electronic warfare officer) scored the first Wild Weasel SAM kill northwest of Hanoi. The tactic worked: fly at the radar, force it to track you, fire the Shrike, and break hard before the SAM launches. The margin for error was measured in seconds.
By 1966, the programme had moved to the Republic F-105F Thunderchief — a two-seat variant of the fast, heavy fighter-bomber that bore the brunt of Rolling Thunder. The “Thud” was faster than the F-100 and could carry both Shrikes and conventional bombs, allowing Weasel crews to suppress a SAM site and then bomb it on the same pass. The F-105G followed with improved electronic warfare systems.
First In, Last Out
The Wild Weasels’ operational doctrine — “First In, Last Out” — was exactly what it sounded like. Before any strike package entered defended airspace, the Weasels went in first to find and suppress the SAM sites. While the bombers hit their targets, the Weasels orbited overhead, keeping the SAM operators busy. After the strikers egressed, the Weasels stayed behind to cover the withdrawal.
It was the most dangerous job in combat aviation. SAM sites shot back. Triple-A filled the sky at low altitude. And the Weasels had to fly predictable profiles — toward the threat — while every other aircraft in the formation was flying away from it. The crews who volunteered for Wild Weasel duty knew exactly what they were signing up for. Donovan’s four-letter reaction was not bravado. It was an accurate assessment.
“You want me to fly in the back of a tiny little jet with a crazy fighter pilot who thinks he’s invincible, home in on a SAM site in North Vietnam, and shoot it before it shoots me? You gotta be shittin’ me!”
Capt. Jack Donovan — First Wild Weasel EWO to score a SAM kill, December 1965
The Wild Weasel mission continues today. The F-16CJ carries the HARM targeting system and AGM-88 HARM missiles. The EA-37B Compass Call provides standoff electronic attack. But the fundamental job — fly at the thing that’s trying to kill you — has not changed since Lamb and Donovan proved it could be done over Hanoi in December 1965.
Sources: USAF Pacific Air Forces, Osprey Combat Aircraft, Air & Space Forces Magazine, Wild Weasels Association
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I was trained as a Missile Guidance and Control tech in the USAF in 1968 and was stationed in Las Vegas at Nellis AFB to be part of the Missile Shop that provided weapons for pilot training school there. We did AIM 7s, AIM 9s, AGM 12s, AGM 45s, and AGM 78s. As it turned out, there was an issue with the AGM 45s that never got straightened out until 1979. The control unit and the guidance unit were separated by the warhead, with a cable going between them. On the control unit, there were two separated connectors on the control unit. One for DIVE mode, the other for LOFT mode. The assembling crew had to make a decision for which one to use before the final assembly was made. This choice was not shown in the cockpit nor was it really told to the loader crews. The problem here being, a LOFT missile can’t be dived, and a DIVE missile can’t be lofted. I had to start marking which ones were which after reading the firing reports that came back to me at the shop. In the end, the pilot trainers refused to believe me it was a problem.
I was trained as a Missile Guidance and Control tech in the USAF in 1968 and was stationed in Las Vegas at Nellis AFB to be part of the Missile Shop that provided weapons for pilot training school there. We did AIM 7s, AIM 9s, AGM 12s, AGM 45s, and AGM 78s. As it turned out, there was an issue with the AGM 45s that never got straightened out until 1979. The control unit and the guidance unit were separated by the warhead, with a cable going between them. On the control unit, there were two separated connectors on the control unit. One for DIVE mode, the other for LOFT mode. The assembling crew had to make a decision for which one to use before the final assembly was made. This choice was not shown in the cockpit nor was it really told to the loader crews. The problem here being, a LOFT missile can’t be dived, and a DIVE missile can’t be lofted. I had to start marking which ones were which after reading the firing reports that came back to me at the shop. In the end, the pilot trainers refused to believe me it was a problem.