In the mid-2000s the US Army and Air Force wanted a smaller aircraft than the C-130 to deliver time-sensitive cargo to forward units, the so-called last tactical mile. In June 2007 the Pentagon chose the C-27J, teamed with L-3, and awarded a contract worth about US$2.04 billion for 78 aircraft with training and support; a protest by the losing team was rejected later that year. Responsibility soon passed entirely to the Air Force, and the numbers fell.

The aircraft proved itself in combat: from August 2011, two C-27Js of the Ohio Air National Guard’s 179th Airlift Wing flew from Kandahar with a mixed Air Guard and Army Guard crew, and between August 2011 and June 2012 the deployed aircraft flew more than 3,200 missions carrying over 25,000 passengers and 1,400 tons of cargo to forward bases. Yet in January 2012 the Department of Defense announced plans to retire all 38 C-27Js the USAF then had on order (21 were eventually bought), arguing that C-130s could do the job more cheaply over their lives; Guard advocates disputed the cost figures fiercely. New aircraft were delivered directly to storage. In 2013 the aircraft were redistributed: 14 to the Coast Guard, which converted them to HC-27J maritime patrol and search-and-rescue aircraft, and 7 to US Special Operations Command, where they support parachute training and special missions.

The G.222 had a long and sometimes tragic operational life. Italian Air Force aircraft flew humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in Africa and the Middle East and were a mainstay of the UN airlift into besieged Sarajevo in 1992. On 3 September 1992, an Italian G.222 on a UN relief mission was shot down by a surface-to-air missile while approaching Sarajevo airport, killing everyone aboard. Responsibility was never clearly established, and the airlift was suspended for a time afterwards.

Other users flew it in their own campaigns, and the type’s Afghan chapter is a cautionary tale. The United States paid about US$486 million to provide refurbished G.222s to the Afghan Air Force from 2009, but the aircraft suffered from poor spares support and low availability. In 2014 sixteen were scrapped at Kabul and sold for about US$32,000 in total, Military Times reported, at roughly six cents per pound. The episode, investigated by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, had nothing to do with the C-27J itself but haunted its reputation in Washington.

Beyond the basic transport, Leonardo has developed several mission versions. The MC-27J Praetorian for the Italian Air Force first flew in March 2014 and was converted from existing C-27Js from 2016; it carries a roll-on/roll-off mission kit with sensors, communications and a palletised side-firing gun system, plus provision for precision-guided weapons on wing hardpoints. An earlier American proposal, the AC-27J Stinger II, was a gunship concept for the US Air Force Special Operations Command that was not pursued.

The HC-27J of the US Coast Guard carries search radar and electro-optical sensors for maritime patrol and search and rescue. Italy also uses C-27Js for firefighting support, medical evacuation and transport of sick patients in isolation stretchers. The C-27J Next Generation, offered from the early 2020s, adds avionics updates and aerodynamic improvements including winglets to keep the design competitive for decades.

• G.222: original Fiat/Aeritalia transport, GE T64 engines, about 110 built 1970–1993.
• G.222T: Rolls-Royce Tyne version for Libya, about 20 ordered.
• G.222SAA, RM, VS: firefighting, radio calibration and electronic surveillance versions in Italian service.
• C-27A Spartan: ten G.222s for the USAF in Panama in the 1990s.
• C-27J: AE2100 engines and C-130J avionics, first flight 1999.
• HC-27J: US Coast Guard patrol and SAR version.
• MC-27J Praetorian: Italian multi-mission and armed ISR version.
• C-27J Next Generation: updated avionics and aerodynamics.

Few transports have had their operating costs debated as publicly as the C-27J. When the US Air Force decided in 2012 to retire its fleet, it argued that the smaller aircraft’s life-cycle costs were higher than those of the larger C-130 it already owned. National Guard leaders and members of Congress challenged the figures, pointing out that two engines burn less fuel than four and that the C-27J was cheaper per hour for missions with small loads. Senators demanded proof of the Air Force’s claims. Both sides used different assumptions about fleet size, support and utilisation, which is why the figure above is presented as contested and as a range.